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The purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how information that should not signal 
output quality influences managers’ evaluations. To address this objective, I pose the following 
research question: In a setting where professional employees generate output that cannot be 
evaluated objectively, will managers use work-day duration to subjectively evaluate the quality 
of their output? 
 I address my research question using two experiments where I vary employees’ work-day 
duration relative to their peers (short versus equal) and the purpose of the evaluation (bonus 
versus promotion) while observing how supervisors make subjective quality evaluations about 
their output. I find that when work-day duration is short and the purpose of the evaluation is a 
bonus, employees are perceived as less hardworking, and receive lower evaluations of output 
quality compared to when work-day duration is equal. I also find that when work-day duration is 
short and the purpose of the evaluation is a promotion, employees are perceived as efficient and 
receive higher evaluations of output quality compared to when work-day duration is equal. 
Importantly, this second finding is observed only when the employees’ output is of good quality, 
but not when it is of moderate quality.  
 My dissertation contributes to existing literature. First, while existing research examines 
effort duration or intensity on particular tasks, to the best of my knowledge, my dissertation is 
the first study to consider how employees’ work-day duration can influence subjective 
evaluations of their output quality. Second, my dissertation contributes to existing research that 
examines inaccurate performance evaluations resulting from cognitive limitations. I identify that 
managers’ knowledge about work-day duration, which provides no information about output 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The work of professional employees (e.g., accountants, lawyers, consultants) is difficult 
to measure. Professionals’ work often requires the application of specified knowledge which is 
evaluated based on its quality. This makes professionals’ output difficult to evaluate with 
objective performance measures (e.g., quantity of output produced). Instead, the output of a 
professional worker is often evaluated based on subjective evaluations of quality rather than 
objective evaluations of quantity (Drucker 1999). When no objective performance measures are 
available, existing research examines how subjectivity can be used to improve performance 
evaluation and compensation contracting (Prendergast 1999; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, 
and Vargus 2004; Bol 2008). However, an unresolved issue within the subjective performance 
evaluation literature is understanding factors that affect managers’ subjective evaluations of 
output quality. Therefore, the purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how information that 
should not signal output quality influences managers’ evaluations. To address this objective, I 
pose the following research question: In a setting where professional employees generate output 
that cannot be evaluated objectively, will managers use work-day duration to subjectively 
evaluate the quality of their output? 
I study the joint effects of work-day duration and the purpose of managers’ evaluations 
on subjective evaluations of professional employees’ output. Specifically, I examine whether 
managers interpret a short work-day duration (i.e., when professional employees’ work hours are 
shorter than the workplace norm) differently from an equal work-day duration (i.e., when 
professional employees’ work hours are consistent with the workplace norm), holding the quality 
of work produced constant. Notably, in my study, I do not examine how the amount of time 
professional employees spend on a particular task (which is often difficult for managers to 
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observe) influences subjective evaluations, but rather I examine how the time professional 
employees spend at work on a typical workday influences subjective evaluations of a piece of 
output.  
I draw on attribute substitute theory (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) to predict why 
managers may use a contextual cue (i.e., work-day duration) that provides no information about 
output quality when making subjective evaluations. According to attribute substitute theory, 
when the target attribute is difficult to evaluate, a heuristic attribute can influence judgment and 
decision making. In my setting, the manager may have difficulty evaluating subjective output 
quality (i.e., the target attribute) and may be easily influenced by contextual cues (i.e., the 
heuristic attribute). Therefore, I predict that work-day duration (i.e., a heuristic attribute) is likely 
to influence managers’ subjective evaluation of quality (i.e., the target attribute). In this two-
experiment thesis, I consider whether work-day duration is observed in two settings: one where 
the employee is considered for a bonus and one where the employee is considered for a 
promotion. I consider these two settings because of the inherent differences between bonus 
rewards and promotion rewards (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; Gibbs 1995). 
In my first experiment, I examine a setting where the quality of the employees’ output is 
good. I begin by considering managers’ judgments when the subjective evaluations of output 
quality will help to determine whether the professional employees will receive a bonus. When 
professional employees signal that they are hardworking during the current period, managers 
may be more likely to award them with a bonus. As prior research indicates that work-day 
duration signals perceptions of hardworking (Elsbach, Cable and Sherman 2010), I predict that 
employees who display a short work-day duration are likely to be perceived as less hardworking 
than employees who display an equal work-day duration. Therefore, I hypothesize that holding 
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the quality of work produced constant, when the performance reward is a bonus and work-day 
duration is short, evaluations of subjective quality will be lower than when work-day duration is 
equal to the workplace norm.  
  Next, I consider a setting where evaluations of subjective output help to determine 
whether professional employees will receive a promotion. Prior research suggests that promotion 
rewards differ from bonus rewards because they not only serve as an incentive but also sort 
employees based on important skills and abilities they have (Baker et al. 1988). In other words, 
in making promotion decisions, managers need to consider how well-suited employees are for 
the next level.1 Similar to when the purpose of the performance reward is a bonus, in promotion 
decisions a short work-day duration is likely to signal that employees are not hardworking. 
However, I predict that when professional employees produce good quality subjective output, 
short work-day duration will send a strong signal that employees are efficient. Although 
hardworking is likely to be an important characteristic in promotion decisions, managers may 
consider efficiency a stronger differentiating characteristic because efficient individuals are more 
likely to adapt to the next level of the job (e.g., to quickly acquire new skills required), an 
important characteristic in evaluations of promotability. Therefore, I hypothesize that holding the 
quality of work produced constant, when the performance reward is a promotion and work-day 
duration is short, evaluations of subjective output quality will be higher than when work-day 
duration is equal to the workplace norm. 
My first experiment (Experiment One) tests a setting where professional employees’ 
subjective output quality is good. I conduct a between-participants experiment that manipulates 
 
1Similar to prior research (Chan 2018), I examine a setting that does not define a promotion rule (i.e., what skills are 
required for promotion). As such, I do not define what the promotion criteria is, nor do I define what the promotive 
task will be.  
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work-day duration (short versus equal) and the purpose of the performance evaluation (bonus 
versus promotion). Work-day duration is manipulated by describing the hours that the 
professional employee works as either short or equal hours compared to other professional 
employees at the same organization (i.e., the workplace norm). The purpose of the performance 
evaluation is manipulated by indicating that the evaluation will help to determine whether the 
professional employee will receive a bonus or a promotion. I recruit 156 professional participants 
online to assume the role of Supervising Manager at a consulting company. Their main task is to 
evaluate the subjective output quality (a response memo to a business issue) produced by a single 
professional employee.   
Results from Experiment One are consistent with my expectations. I find that when the 
purpose of the evaluation is to determine a bonus, a short work-day duration results in lower 
evaluations of subjective output quality, compared to an equal work-day duration. I also find that 
when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a promotion, a short work-day duration 
results in higher evaluations of subjective output quality, compared to an equal work-day 
duration. Taken together, my results suggest that when employee output is good and work-day 
duration is short, evaluations of subjective output quality will depend on whether the purpose of 
the evaluation is to determine a bonus or a promotion.  
I perform a second experiment (Experiment Two) that examines whether the joint effects of 
work-day duration and the purpose of the performance review persist when subjective output 
quality is less than good. The experimental procedures and manipulations in Experiment Two are 
identical to Experiment One with one exception: subjective output quality of the response memo 
is moderate. I find that when subjective output quality is moderate and the purpose of the 
performance reward is a bonus, evaluations of subjective output quality are lower when 
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employees work a short work-day duration compared to employees who work an equal work-day 
duration. This observation is consistent with Experiment One. However, when subjective output 
quality is moderate and the purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, evaluations of 
subjective output quality are similar whether employees work a short work-day duration or an 
equal work-day duration. This finding is contrary to that of Experiment One. Taken together, I 
find that when output quality is moderate, work-day duration continues to affect subjective 
evaluations of output in bonus decisions, but not in promotion decisions.  
My dissertation makes important contributions to research that examines subjectivity in 
compensation contracting. I examine how a non-informative contextual cue can influence 
subjective evaluations of output quality and, more specifically, how the role of work-day 
duration depends on the purpose of the performance evaluation. First, research in accounting 
primarily examines settings where work-day duration is contractible (i.e., employees are required 
to spend a specified amount of time at work), and performance is ultimately increased by 
incentivizing effort intensity (i.e., how hard the employee works during the specified amount of 
time at work) (e.g., Awasthi and Pratt 1990; Tafkov 2013; Hecht, Rotaru, Schulz, Towry and 
Webb 2018). Different from research that examines effort duration or intensity on particular 
tasks, I focus on employees’ work-day duration and how it influences subjective evaluations of 
their output quality. Second, prior research identifies and empirically examines how evaluator 
biases can lead to inaccurate evaluations of subjective performance (e.g., Bol 2008, 2011), and 
within that literature, some studies examine how cognitive limitations result in evaluator biases 
in subjective evaluations (e.g., Bol and Smith 2011; Bol and Leiby 2018). My study contributes 
to this line of research by identifying that a non-informative contextual cue (work-day duration) 
influences evaluations of output quality. Thus, my study differs from prior research as I examine 
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how non-informative contextual cues influence the subjective evaluation of employees’ work 
output as opposed to the assessment of their general performance.    
My research has practical importance. My findings indicate that work-day duration is used to 
evaluate the quality of subjective output and that its influence depends on the purpose of the 
evaluation. This is important as employees are often afforded the opportunity to work flexible 
hours. For example, given the changing dynamics of North American families (United States 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics 2018; Uppal 2015), working parents are increasingly 
juggling the demands of working out of the house and effectively managing family 
responsibilities (Wademan Dowling 2019). In the meantime, increasingly employers are 
requiring that their employees work long hours and be available outside of normal working hours 
(Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). My study provides empirical evidence that the quality of work that 
is produced by professional employees who work hard in a short amount of time will be 
evaluated to be of lower quality when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether they 
will receive a bonus. However, when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a promotion 
and output quality is good, delivering the same output in a short amount of time signals that the 
employees are efficient, which leads to biases of quality evaluations in the opposite direction.  
The remainder of my thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I review psychology, 
economics and accounting literatures related to subjective evaluations of bonus and promotion 
rewards, and I review the applicability of attribute substitute theory. In Chapter 3, I develop 
hypotheses for both experiments. Chapter 4 describes methods for both experiments, and Chapter 
5 describes the results from both experiments. Conclusions are provided in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I use the existing economics, psychology and accounting literature to first 
examine cognitive limitations in subjective performance evaluations and second to explore why 
and how work-day duration and reward purpose could affect subjective evaluations of output 
quality. In Section 2.2, I describe subjectivity in performance evaluations, in Section 2.3, I 
explore attribute substitution theory and in Section 2.4 I discuss subjectivity and reward purpose. 
Conclusions are provided in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Subjectivity in Performance Evaluations 
 
 In this section, I provide an overview of subjectivity in performance evaluations and 
describe the role of subjective performance measures. Within the existing subjectivity literature, 
I review studies that examine inaccuracies that can result from either managers’ own self-interest 
or from managers’ cognitive limitations.    
 
2.2.1 Overview of Subjectivity in Performance Evaluations 
 
 Generally, there are two options for evaluating employee performance: objective 
evaluations and subjective evaluations (Bol 2008). Objective performance measures are used 
when employees’ output is quantifiable and is verifiable for contracting purposes (Woods 2012). 
Examples of objective indicators of performance include levels of sales, profit or asset values 
(Rajan and Reichelstein 2009). Subjectivity is included in performance evaluations when it is 
difficult to objectively measure performance and is done so in three different ways; first, 
performance can be evaluated through subjective performance measures; second, the weight of 
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performance measures can be flexible to allow managers to make ex-post changes based on 
information learned during the contracting period; and third, ex-post adjustments can be made to 
performance measures determined ex-ante to incorporate information learned during the 
contracting period (Gibbs et al. 2004). In my dissertation, I examine the subjective measurement 
of output quality and, therefore, my primary focus is on the first mechanism: evaluating 
performance using subjective measures.2 
Subjective performance measures are defined as “superior’s subjective judgments about 
qualitative performance indicators” (Moers 2005, 68). They are often used as indicators of 
managerial performance for dimensions of employees’ jobs that are difficult or impossible for 
organizations to include in compensation contracts (Rajan and Reichelstein 2006, 2009). 
Examples of tasks measured by subjective performance measures include “good use of 
resources” or “adequate planning” (Moers 2005). These are subjective performance measures 
because they are used to reward value-enhancing efforts that are not easy to quantify and 
therefore would otherwise be difficult to include in evaluations of performance (Gibbs et al. 
2004).  
In Sections 2.2.2 to 2.2.3, I review relevant studies that highlight the benefits and costs 
that arise when subjectivity is included in evaluations of employees’ performance. 
 
2.2.2 Benefits of Subjectivity  
 
 Existing research suggests that the benefits of subjective performance evaluations in 
compensation contracts can include compensation risk reduction, reduction of perceived 
unfairness, inducement of adaptive behaviour and mitigation of incentive distortions (Bol 2008).  
 
2 While performance evaluations that include a mix of both objective and subjective measures can be effective in 
capturing all dimensions of employees’ performance (Prendergast 1999), in my dissertation I examine a single 
dimension of an employees’ job that is evaluated solely by subjective measures.  
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Subjectivity benefits employees’ contracts because it can reduce the compensation risk to 
employees. When only objective evaluations are used, one compensation risk employees can 
face is that objective performance evaluations can be negatively influenced by uncontrollable 
events (Bol 2008). Uncontrollable events are unknown ex-ante in contract design and therefore 
cannot be contracted on explicitly. To reduce this risk to employees, managers can be endowed 
with ex-post discretion. This discretion allows managers to incorporate information learned 
during the contracting period (e.g., information related to the occurrence of an uncontrollable 
event) that was unknown ex-ante in the contact design phase (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994; 
Gibbs et al. 2004).  
Archival research provides evidence of ex-post adjustments in subjective performance 
evaluations to reduce such compensation risk that relates to the occurrence of negative 
uncontrollable events. An archival study of CEO incentive contracts from 579 firms shows that 
discretionary bonuses are often included in compensation contracts of CEOs when ex-ante 
performance measures are likely to be impacted by uncontrollable events (Höppe and Moers 
2011). A second archival study using hand-collected data from 490 firms and 583 firm years 
from Form 8k and proxy statements, finds that when objective information results in 
measurements of performance that are extreme (i.e., either really low or really high), subjective 
information is perceived as informative, resulting in a higher likelihood of discretionary bonus 
payments (Ederhof 2010). A third archival study using data collected from performance-equity 
plans from 228 public firms in China finds that as environmental uncertainty, CEO power, 
competition intensity and non-price competition increases, the likelihood that managers will 
provide different weightings of objective versus subjective performance measures for top 
managers compared to middle managers is also increased (Chen, Gao, Wang and Xue 2019).  
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Research from the field also provides evidence supporting the use of subjective 
performance evaluations to reduce compensation risk stemming from the occurrence of negative 
uncontrollable events. For example, when sales targets are determined centrally by corporate 
headquarters, managers are more likely to use their discretion and set more attainable sales 
targets for postal stores that face higher (vs. lower) environmental uncertainty (Bol, Keune, 
Matsumura and Shin 2010). A second study of a large US retailer finds that when managers are 
exposed to environmental uncertainty and face greater noise from objective measures of 
performance, supervisors will increase subjective performance evaluations (Anderson, Dekker, 
Sedatole and Wiersma 2020). 
 Subjectivity also benefits employees’ contracts because it can be used to reduce 
perceived unfairness (Bol 2008; Voußem, Kramer and Schäffer 2016). Perceived fairness is 
important in performance evaluations because it affects employees’ motivations (Colquitt, 
Conlon, Wesson, Porter and Ng 2001). When employees work in teams, perceived fairness is of 
particular importance because it is often aggregate team output that is used to determine 
individual rewards. Three experimental studies examine how subjective evaluations allow 
managers to restore perceived fairness in a team setting (i.e., when team members do not 
contribute similarly to aggregate team output). First, in an experiment where 126 undergraduate 
student participants perform an effort choice task, when making subjective evaluations, 
managers are more likely to obtain costly information about individuals’ contributions to team 
performance when aggregate measures provide a noisy signal about individuals’ contributions 
(i.e., when aggregate performance is less extreme) (Maas, van Rinsum and Towry 2012). 
Interestingly, the study also finds that out of concerns for reciprocity, managers are more likely 
to obtain costly information for high levels of extreme performance compared to low levels of 
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extreme performance. A second experimental study, using 148 undergraduate students and an 
effort choice task, examines how to increase perceived fairness of compensation in a team setting 
(Arnold, Hannan and Tafkov 2018). Results of this study show that one way to reduce the costs 
of obtaining information about individuals’ contributions to aggregate team output is to endow 
employees with the opportunity to provide managers with subjective communication about the 
efforts of other team members (i.e., report on mutual monitoring). That said, when team 
members have heterogeneous abilities (i.e., they do not have the same ability to generate profit), 
the subjective communication is more dispersed, which is less useful to managers. This causes 
managers to deviate from individual team members’ subjective communication in their 
subjective evaluations. Finally, an experiment using 188 undergraduate students, where some 
participants assume a manager role and others assume an employee role, shows that when the 
team task is not interdependent, subjective performance evaluations increase team performance, 
but when the team task is interdependent, subjective evaluations decrease team performance 
(Arnold and Tafkov 2019). The results indicate that when the team task is interdependent, 
subjective evaluations have a negative influence on team cohesion, which in turn has a negative 
effect on team performance.  
In addition to the use of subjectivity to reduce perceived unfairness in teams, subjectivity 
in the target setting process also allows managers to restore fairness perceptions when employees 
are rewarded based on relative performance evaluations. This is particularly important when the 
group of employees under evaluation have heterogeneous abilities. In this case, research using 
archival data from 103 postal stores in Korea shows that managers sometimes use discretion ex-
ante in the contract design phase and assign more attainable targets to branches with lower 
ability to generate profit in order to restore perceptions of fairness (Bol et al. 2010).  
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Subjectivity also benefits compensation contracts because it can induce adaptive 
behaviours. As priorities of companies may change during the contracting period, allowing 
managerial discretion to change the weighting of objective performances encourages employees 
to adapt their behaviours accordingly (Bol 2008). For example, in an archival study using CEO 
contracts from SEC Proxy Statements, subjective weights are more prevalent when there is 
environmental unpredictability (Höppe and Moers 2011). Providing subjective weights in these 
fast-changing environments can encourage CEOs to adapt quickly, which better aligns the goals 
of the company with the goals of the CEO. Managers also consider how their use of subjectivity 
will affect employees’ adaptive behaviour in future periods. In an experimental study using 97 
graduate student participants who are required to make bonus allocations of two employees, the 
researchers examine whether managers will consider the signal they will send to employees if 
they choose to incorporate non-contractible subjective information into their subjective bonus 
allocations (Bol, Hecht and Smith 2015). The study finds that when subjective non-contractible 
information is the result of an uncontrollable event, managers are more likely to incorporate the 
non-contractible information into bonus allocations decisions, but only when the likelihood of 
the event is low (i.e., is not likely to reoccur) and the bonus pool is not shared among other 
employees.   
Finally, subjectivity benefits compensation contracts because it can mitigate incentive 
distortions that arise when the compensation contract is incomplete. (i.e., not all job dimensions 
are observable or measurable) (Holmstrom 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Feltham and 
Xie 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol 2008). Incentive distortions arise because when difficult 
to measure job dimensions are not incentivized, it encourages employees to focus their effort on 
only incentivized dimensions (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). To mitigate this problem, 
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managers can subjectively increase ratings of performance to incorporate effort that is not easily 
quantified (Bol 2008). For example, a field study at an internal audit organization finds that 
when the organization adopts a new performance evaluation system and managers perceive the 
new objective indicators to be insufficient measures of performance, managers are likely to use 
their knowledge of employees’ past performance and make upward adjustments (Woods 2012). 
 
2.2.3 Costs of Subjectivity 
 
 Although there are many benefits of subjective performance evaluations in compensation 
contracting, existing research has identified some costs associated with its use. The costs can 
either originate from the managers’ use of subjective performance evaluations or from 
employees’ reactions to managers’ use of subjective performance evaluations. For example, 
managers can renege on their promises or can provide inaccurate assessments of performance 
and employees can engage in influence activities or reduce effort because of the lack of certainty 
in the measurement criteria (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Bol 2008).  
An important cost of subjective evaluations in compensation contracting is that its use 
can result in inaccurate evaluations of performance (Baker et al. 1988). Inaccurate subjective 
performance evaluations can be defined as the “divergence from ‘true’ performance” (Bol 2008, 
12). In some cases, inaccurate subjective performance evaluations can be harmful because they 
reduce the effectiveness of incentives, which negatively affects productivity at the firm level 
(Baker et al. 1988) and reduces effort or increases quitting at the employee level (Prendergast 
and Topel 1993; Bol 2008). The subjective performance evaluation literature has identified two 
types of inaccurate subjective performance evaluation: 1) intentional inaccurate subjective 
performance evaluations (Moers 2005; Bol 2008, 2011; Bol et al. 2010; Du, Tang and Young 
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2012; Bol, Kramer and Maas 2016; Du, Erkens, Young and Tang 2018), or 2) unintentional 
inaccurate subjective performance evaluations (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher, Schulz and 
Rotaru 2019; Bailey, Hecht, and Towry 2011; Lipe and Salterio 2000; Kramer and Maas 2020; 
Bauch and Weibenberger 2020). In the subsections that follow, I will review research on both 
types of inaccurate performance evaluations.  
 
2.2.3.1 Intentional Inaccurate Subjective Performance Evaluations  
 
The opportunity for managers to act in their own self-interest and make intentional 
inaccurate evaluations is increased when evaluations are subjective. This is because in most 
cases, the manager is responsible for making the evaluation but the organization (i.e., not the 
manager) bears the cost of any inaccurate evaluations (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Prendergast 
1999; Moers 2005; Bol 2008). As a result, the manager may act in their own self-interest and 
consider personal benefits and costs in the evaluation of employees (Prendergast and Topel 
1993; Bol 2008) and be influenced by reasons other than improving the compensation contract 
(Woods 2012).  
Prior research documents three types of managers’ preferences that may result in 
inaccurate subjective performance evaluations: avoidance of high information gathering costs, 
avoidance of providing negative feedback and favouritism (Bol 2008). Information gathering 
costs refers to the time, effort and monetary costs incurred by the manager to obtain information 
about employee performance (Bol 2011). Avoidance of providing negative feedback refers to 
managers avoiding the costs (e.g., psychological costs) of delivering negative feedback to 
employees (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Favouritism refers to when managers favour certain 
employee(s) over other employees (Prendergast and Topel 1996; Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 
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2003). When managers incorporate these preferences into subjective performance evaluations, 
they can provide lenient (i.e., overinflated evaluations for all or certain employees) or centralized 
(i.e., performance evaluations with little variation between employees) assessments of 
performance (Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2010; Bol et al. 2016).3   
  Moers (2005) provides archival evidence from performance evaluation data of 124 
employees of a Dutch firm, regarding the existence of both the leniency and centrality biases. 
When performance is evaluated and rewarded using either multiple objective measures or 
subjective measures, both lenient and centralized ratings of performance are observed. 
Additional archival research provides insights as to why subjective performance evaluations are 
influenced by the leniency and centrality biases. Using performance evaluation data of a 
financial services firm, two managerial preferences that are antecedents to intentional subjective 
biases are identified: avoidance of high information-gathering costs and strong employee-
manager relationships (Bol 2011). In the firm studied, both high information-gathering costs and 
strong employee-manager relationships influence both the leniency and the centrality biases, 
leading to inaccurate evaluations of subjective performance. Interestingly, the results also show 
that performance evaluations affected by the leniency bias have positive consequences on 
employee performance, whereas performance evaluations affected by the centrality bias have 
negative consequences on employee performance. This difference is thought to be caused by the 
perception that lenient evaluations are fairer, which has a positive effect on employees’ 
motivation and performance.  
Two studies, based on archival performance evaluation data from the Chinese 
government’s evaluation of Chinese state-owned enterprises (Du et al. 2012; Du et al. 2018), 
 
3An analytical model shows that even if managers prefer to provide accurate performance evaluations, the inherent 
noise in subjective evaluations will result in the both the leniency and centrality biases (Golman and Bhatia 2012). 
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provide field evidence of mangers’ intentional leniency biases. In their first study, the 
researchers find that both bottom-up influence activities (e.g., the level of political connections 
of the CFO and the geographic proximity to headquarters) and top-down favouritism (e.g., the 
political rank of the firm) result in more favourable evaluations (Du et al. 2012). In their second 
study, when a new indicator of performance replaced an old indicator of performance, evidence 
of leniency bias is observed (Du et al. 2018).  
One study examines centrality bias without consideration of the leniency bias. An 
experimental study finds that information accuracy and transparency jointly influence managers’ 
intentional centrality bias in subjective evaluations of performance (Bol et al. 2016). 
Interestingly, information accuracy leads to less centralized performance scores, but only in 
settings where information transparency is high (i.e., when employees are aware of each other’s 
performance).  
Although the bulk of the existing literature examines leniency and centrality biases in ex-
post evaluations of performance, one study provides evidence that the leniency bias could also 
exists ex-ante as part of the target-setting process (Bol et al. 2010). In a setting where decreasing 
the sales target of one store will increase the sales target of another store, this study shows 
managers are more likely to subjectively set lower targets for stores whose managers have higher 
hierarchal status.  
Finally, a recent study using propriety data from a large multinational organization finds 
that the use of calibration committees (i.e., a group of higher-level managers that review initial 
subjective evaluations and make adjustments where necessary) can mitigate the leniency bias 
(Demeré, Sedatole and Woods 2019). The study finds that calibration committees are likely to 
make downward adjustments to initial subjective evaluations that are higher than average (i.e., 
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mitigating the leniency bias). That said, the study also shows that such adjustments increase the 
centrality bias. A second study using archival performance evaluation data from a professional 
services provider finds that both the leniency bias and the centrality bias can be reduced by 
calibration committees (Grabner, Künneke and Moers 2020). In this research setting, the 
calibration committee is also responsible for reviewing the evaluating supervisors’ performance. 
Their study shows that because calibration committees will punish (via decreased performance 
ratings) supervisors who are strategically lenient and reward (via a higher likelihood of 
promotion) supervisors who are able to provide less compressed ratings, calibration committees 
can mitigate the leniency and centrality biases.  
 
2.2.3.2 Unintentional Inaccurate Subjective Performance Evaluations 
 
 Unintentional inaccurate assessments result when managers’ cognitive limitations 
interfere with subjective evaluations of performance. Specifically, a cognitive limitation 
“prevents managers from fully exploiting all information on employee performance” (Bol 2008, 
12). Empirical research examines different factors which result in cognitive limitations that 
affect subjective performance evaluations. Specifically, prior research examines cognitive 
distortion (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019), the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic (Bailey et al. 2011), the outcome effect (Wong-on-Wing, Guo, Li and Yang 2007; 
Long, Mertins and Vansant 2015), the common measures bias (Lipe and Salterio 2000; Libby, 
Salterio and Webb 2004), the escalation of commitment bias (Kramer and Maas 2020) and the 
likability bias (Bauch and Weibenberger 2020).   
 Cognitive distortion can arise when managers evaluate employees using both objective 
and subjective indicators of performance (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019). 
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Specifically, in experimental settings, when managers have knowledge of employees’ ratings on 
an unrelated objective indictor of performance, it will spill over to managers’ assessments on the 
subjective indicator of performance (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019). This bias is 
shown to be stronger when managers engage in a more intuitive (i.e., a less effortful cognitive 
processing) decision mode as compared to a deliberate (i.e., a more effortful cognitive 
processing) decision mode (Fehrenbacher et al. 2019).  
Experimental research examines how the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is used 
when both objective and subjective information is available in bonus pool allocations (Bailey et 
al. 2011). In this study, 170 graduate students adopt the role of manager and make bonus 
allocation decisions for fictitious employees. The results of the study provide evidence that, 
rather than considering objective and subjective information holistically, managers adopt an 
anchoring and adjustment approach where managers anchor on either objective, contractible 
information or an equal split between employees in the bonus pool, and then insufficiently adjust 
for subjective non-contractible information. As a result, the subjective non-contractible 
information is not fully incorporated into bonus pool allocation decisions. That said, results of 
this study also suggest that managers’ tendency to incorporate subjective non-contractible 
information into subjective bonus pool allocations can be increased by endowing managers with 
only partial discretion, as opposed to full discretion, over bonus pool allocations.4  
Existing research defines the outcome effect to be when the knowledge of outcomes can 
directionally influence evaluators’ judgments (Tan and Lipe 1997; Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer and 
Stewart 2016). In a performance evaluation setting, the outcome effect can bias managers’ 
 
4 In their study, participants endowed with full discretion were responsible for making subjective allocations for the 
full bonus pool whereas participants endowed with partial discretion were responsible for making subjective 
allocations for half of the bonus pool while the other half was determined using non-subjective measures. 
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subjective performance evaluations when knowledge of the outcome directionally influences the 
evaluation (Wong-on-Wing et al. 2007; Long et al. 2015). Two experimental studies show that 
the outcome effect can influence subjective performance evaluations. First, Long et al. (2015) 
find that the outcome effect influences the extent to which managers incorporate subjective non-
contractible information when they evaluate performance across multiple measures. Using 119 
graduate student participants who assume the role of manager, this research provides evidence 
that when weight allocations of multiple performance measures are specified, and when 
subjective information is consistent with the valence of performance measure outcome, managers 
are less likely to incorporate subjective non-contractible information into evaluations of 
performance compared to when weight allocations are not specified. Second, Wong-on-Wing et 
al.’s (2007) experiment examines the discrepancy of performance evaluations between raters and 
ratees. They find that raters’ evaluations are more likely to be influenced by performance on 
outcome rather than driver measures, compared to ratees’ evaluations. 
 An experimental study using 58 graduate students shows that the common measures bias 
is likely to occur when employees are evaluated using multiple performance measures that 
include a mix of measures that are common to all employees at the organization and unique to all 
employees at the organization. Common measures bias refers to when managers have discretion 
over how to weight common and unique measures, they often weight the common measures 
more heavily than the unique measure (Lipe and Salterio 2000). Interestingly, a similarly 
designed follow-up study shows that this bias can be reduced when managers are held 
accountable for their evaluations or when provided with third-party assurance of the quality of 
performance measures (Libby et al. 2004).  
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An experimental study, using 97 student participants, provides evidence that escalation of 
commitment bias is also a cognitive limitation that can influence managers when making 
subjective performance evaluations (Kramer and Maas 2020). Specifically, when managers have 
previously recommended an employee for promotion, they are more likely to subsequently 
provide higher subjective ratings of their performance.  
Finally, an experimental study of 111 students who assume the role of an evaluating 
manager finds that when the likability bias (i.e., how likeable an employee is based on factors 
that can either be related to their productive effort or factors unrelated to their productive effort) 
is unintentional, a requirement of justifying evaluations induces more effortful evaluations, 
mitigating the likeability bias. However, when the likeability bias is intentional, a requirement of 
justifying evaluations induces a self-serving interpretation leading to even higher levels of the 
likeability bias (Bauch and Weibenberger 2020).  
In summary, subjectivity can be introduced into the compensation contract to improve its 
ability to reward employees for their efforts. However, a review of existing research suggests 
that in some cases, the use of subjectivity can lead to both intentional and unintentional 
inaccurate evaluations of performance.  
 
2.3 Attribute Substitution 
 
In the previous section, I highlighted how existing research examines some heuristics and 
biases in subjective performance evaluations. In my dissertation, I explore whether, and when, 
the attribute substitution heuristic could influence subjective performance evaluations. In this 
section I review existing research about the attribute substitution heuristic.  
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2.3.1 Heuristics and Attribute Substitution 
 
When judgments involve uncertainty, they can be informed by heuristic principles which 
shorten judgmental operations by turning complex judgements into simple ones (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). The attribute substitution heuristic is a combination of the representative 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) heuristics as it 
occurs in situations where target attribute does not easily come to mind, but other related and 
available attributes (i.e., the “heuristic attributes”) do (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). For 
example, a question about the severity of weather in Canada may be difficult to answer. 
Respondents may answer this question by quickly saying “cold.” To do this, they could have 
considered only the weather during a particular month, such as January (i.e., a cold winter 
month) as a representation of all weather in Canada. 
In order for attribute substitution to occur, three conditions must be satisfied. First, the 
target attribute must be relatively inaccessible. Second, the heuristic attribute must readily come 
to mind. Third, the heuristic attribute must not be rejected by the rational System II thinking.5 
Importantly, when the evaluator relies on the heuristic attribute to evaluate the target attribute, 
systematic biases can result because these two attributes are not always the same (Kahneman and 
Frederick 2002). 
 
2.3.2 Attribute Substitution in Performance Evaluation 
 
A stream of accounting research draws on attribute substitution to explain why proxies 
are used in performance measurement to evaluate broad strategic objectives that are difficult to 
 
5 System I and System II thinking are two different families of cognitive operations. System I is intuitive (e.g., 
automatic, effortless or associative) whereas System II is reflective (controlled, effortful and deductive) (Kahneman 
and Frederick 2002). 
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measure. The proxy is a performance metric that is used to simplify the judgment. It is 
representative of the strategic objective, is quantifiable and easily comes to mind. When a proxy 
performance metric is used to operationalize a strategic objective, managers and employees lose 
sight of the underlying firm strategy, a phenomenon called surrogation (Choi, Hecht and Tayler 
2012, 2013; Bentley 2019). This research provides examples of how attribute substitution may 
be used in strategy evaluations, but it does not consider managers’ subjective evaluations of 
employees. My thesis fills this gap by examining whether and how attribute substitution can 
affect the subjective evaluation of the output quality of professional employees’ work.  
 
2.3.3 Attribute Substitution Based on Duration 
 
For attribute substitution to occur in the evaluation of subjective output quality, a 
heuristic attribute must be easily available. In this section, I explore why duration may be used as 
a heuristic attribute in evaluations of subjective output quality. 
Research in psychology and other applied disciplines, such as marketing, recognize that 
judgments of quality are difficult to determine, and therefore, apply theory grounded in heuristics 
to consider evaluators’ judgment of quality (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven and Alternmatt 2004; 
Yeung and Soman 2007). When making ambiguous judgments of output quality, a psychology 
study shows that effort (i.e., the time spent on the task) will have an influence on evaluators’ 
judgments of output quality (Kruger et al. 2004). In their study, participants evaluate the quality 
of a painting and rate it higher when they think it took the artist 26 hours to complete compared 
to when they think it took four hours to complete. Similarly, in a consumer behaviour study, 
duration (i.e., the length of a service) is used as a basis to evaluate the value of a service and its 
use is increased when duration is considered in relation to its price (Yeung and Soman 2007).  
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The two studies above illustrate how duration can affect quality evaluations, outside of a 
workplace setting. Within a workplace setting, existing research shows that duration can 
influence both perceptions of employees and the determination of performance rewards. First, 
when employees display passive facetime (defined as being seen at work during normal hours or 
being seen at work outside of normal hours), they are viewed as more committed and 
dependable. These are characteristics that interview respondents associate with being more 
hardworking (Elsbach et al. 2010). Second, a field experiment at a Chinese travel agency shows 
that when employees work at home as opposed to working in the office (i.e., they display less 
facetime), they are less likely to earn a promotion reward (Bloom, Liang, Roberts and Ying 
2015). Third, a meta-analysis of 140 studies examining predictors of career successes finds that 
the number of hours that an employee works positively influences both increases in salaries and 
promotions (Ng, Eby, Sorensen and Feldman 2005).  
In summary, judgments of quality can be difficult for evaluators to determine and they 
sometimes rely on heuristics to help simplify the judgment. I further explore attribute substitute 
theory as a possible theory to explain how evaluators may make judgments of output quality in 
subjective performance evaluations.  
 
2.4 Subjectivity and Reward Purpose 
 
In the preceding sections, I reviewed the role of subjectivity in performance evaluations 
and how, in some cases, they can result in inaccurate evaluations of performance. Using attribute 
substitution theory, I explored why duration may be used by evaluators in making subjective 
evaluations of output quality. As my dissertation examines bonus rewards and promotion 
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rewards, I build on this discussion in Section 2.4 by reviewing literature that examines how 
bonuses and promotions are determined (at least in part) by using elements of subjectivity.  
 In Section 2.4.1, I describe how subjectivity might be used differently in bonus and 
promotion reward decisions. In Section 2.4.2, I review research related to bonus rewards, and in 
Section 2.4.3, I review research related to promotion rewards.  
 
2.4.1 Bonus and Promotion Rewards 
 
 Bonus rewards are a typical financial incentive used by managers to motivate employees 
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002) and are often awarded on the basis of exceeding a performance 
threshold for the current period (Prendergast 1999). The performance threshold can be 
determined ex-ante using a formulaic approach, can be determined ex-post using a discretionary 
approach or can be determined using a combination of both of these approaches (Bailey et al. 
2011). 
Promotions rewards serve two important functions to organizations; an incentive function 
and a sorting function. They incentivize employees by motivating them to learn new skills that 
will qualify them for a role that has higher pay, increased prestige and more responsibilities 
(Prendergast 1993; Grabner and Moers 2015). Promotions rewards are the mechanism by which 
employees move up the hierarchal ranks at an organization (Gibbs 1995). Therefore, only 
employees with the right skills and abilities will earn a promotion, which allows managers to 
effectively sort employees into roles that they are capable of doing (Baker et al. 1988; Gibbs 
1995).  
Promotion rewards differ from bonus rewards in several important ways. First, bonus 
rewards do not require managers to match employees’ skills to requirements of their job level, 
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whereas, when awarding promotions, managers should match the employees’ skills and abilities 
to the job level they are best suited for (Baker et al. 1988). Second, bonuses are often considered 
by evaluators over one period, which means that they motivate employees’ current period 
performance only. Promotions differ because they are often considered by evaluators over a 
longer horizon, which means they can motivate employees beyond the current period (Baker et 
al. 1988). Third, bonuses are one-time, current period payments whereas promotions are often 
associated with permanent salary increases (Gibbs 1995).  
Employees can simultaneously be eligible for both bonus rewards and promotion rewards 
(e.g., Balakrishnan, Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan 2019). A study of professional employees 
at a technology firm shows that employees can be eligible for promotions and financial 
incentives at the same time (Baik, Evans, Kim and Yanadori 2016). In other circumstances, 
employees can be independently eligible for a bonus reward or a promotion reward. Some 
studies examine the effects bonus rewards alone have on employee performance. For example, 
employees at a call centre who are eligible to earn tournament style bonus rewards have a 
tendency to become complacent when they are top performers and give up when they are bottom 
performers (Berger, Klassen, Libby and Webb 2013). A second field study using compensation 
data from a multi-national organization shows that when implicit incentives from earning a 
promotion are weak (i.e., the likelihood of promotion is low), explicit incentives from receiving a 
bonus are strong (Ederhof 2011). Other studies examine the effects of promotion rewards alone 
on employee performance. For example, employees at a quick-service restaurant who are eligible 
for a promotion allocate more effort to non-financial performance measures compared to 
employees who are not eligible for a promotion (Campbell 2008).  
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2.4.2 Bonuses as Rewards for Performance 
 
 A well-established stream of psychology research examines how bonuses are used to 
reward objective performance measures. Bonus rewards are provided to recognize the 
achievement of a goal or objective (Locke 2004). Several studies document the positive 
performance effects of rewarding a cash bonus to employees that attain objective performance 
goals (Locke and Latham 2002; Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle and Young 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002).  
More recently, management accounting researchers examine how rewarding different 
types of bonuses for the attainment of objective measures can influence performance. Some 
studies examine how employees’ behaviours are affected when they are eligible to receive bonus 
rewards. For example, a quasi-experiment using 570 financial services call centre employees 
finds that when eligible to receive cash bonus rewards (as opposed to tangible non-cash rewards) 
for goal attainment, employees are more likely to select difficult goals, which has a positive 
effect on performance (Presslee, Vance and Webb 2013). Also, some studies examine how 
objective measures are selected by managers in rewarding bonuses. An experimental study of 
138 undergraduate students finds that lower ability individuals perform better on a decoding task 
when managers select a goal that is based on their ability as opposed to when managers select a 
goal that is common to all participants (Jeffrey, Schulz and Webb 2012). 
While there is a significant amount of research that examines the use of objective 
performance measures in rewarding bonuses, there is much less research that examines the use of 
subjective performance measures in rewarding bonuses. Recent research in management 
accounting has begun to explore how subjective performance evaluations for bonus rewards 
affect employee performance. For example, an experimental study provides evidence that when 
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ex-post goal adjustments are available to filter out unforeseen and uncontrollable events, 
performance is improved for moderately set goals (Kelly, Webb and Vance 2015). A second 
experimental study shows that in difficult work periods and when ex-post adjustments are 
available to filter out negative uncontrollable events, superior-subordinate identity moderates the 
relationship between the availability of an ex-post adjustment and expectancy of receiving a 
reward, such that expectancy of the reward is higher when superior-subordinate identity is high 
compared to when it is low (Burt, Libby and Presslee 2020). Furthermore, the study finds when 
superior-subordinate identity is high there is a positive indirect effect of the availability of an ex-
post adjustment on performance through reward expectancy. Further evidence from the field 
shows that at a Chinese manufacturing firm, in a tournament setting, when subjectively 
determined bonuses are rewarded to one department and subjectively determined penalties are 
rewarded to another department, overall firm performance is not improved (Cai and Gallani 
2017). In addition to examining how employees’ performance is affected by subjectivity, other 
recent research examines how managers use subjectivity when determining bonus rewards. For 
example, in an experiment where graduate students assume the role of a manager, the managers’ 
subjective adjustments to filter out the negative effects of an uncontrollable event were most 
prevalent when the likelihood that the event will reoccur was low and the bonus pool was not 
interdependent (i.e., their decision will not affect the bonus of allocations of other employees) 
(Bol et al. 2015). A second example using field data of a large travel retailer shows that when ex-
post subjective bonuses are available, managers set higher targets for their employees (Aranda, 




2.4.3 Promotions as Rewards for Performance 
 
In this section, I review existing research that examines how information might be used 
differently to determine promotions and the general role of performance measures in promotion 
decisions. Recent archival research provides evidence that organizations are using different 
performance measures to evaluate employees’ current performance compared to evaluations of 
their future potential (Deller 2018). The study shows that managers are able to provide different 
evaluations of these two types of measures, but those divergences tend to decrease over time. 
Existing research also provides evidence that performance measures are used differently when 
employees are eligible for a promotion compared to when they are not eligible for a promotion 
(Campbell 2008; Bol and Leiby 2018; Chan and Thornock 2019). First, non-financial measures 
(such as customer satisfaction surveys) are more heavily weighted in the evaluation of lower-
level managers at a fast-food retailer when they are promotion eligible than when they are not 
(Campbell 2008). Second, experimental research finds that when professional employees are 
promotion eligible, their engagement in consultative decision making has a more negative effect 
on promotion prospect evaluations compared to when they are not promotion eligible (Bol and 
Leiby 2018). Interestingly, this study finds that this phenomenon occurs because the manager 
adopts a different cognitive schema to evaluate the subjective cue of consultative decision 
making when the employees are promotion eligible compared to when they are not. Third, 
experimental research also finds that the rating granularity of performance measures affects 
subjective performance evaluations differently when employees are promotion eligible compared 
to when they are not (Chan and Thornock 2019). Specifically, when employees are promotion 
eligible, subjective performance evaluations are higher under a single-rating system (i.e., 
managers provide a single overall performance rating) compared to a multiple-rating system (i.e., 
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managers provide a single overall performance rating, but only after rating all individual aspects 
of employees’ jobs). However, when employees are not promotion eligible, the granularity of the 
rating system does not affect subjective performance evaluations. 
Prior research also examines the role of current year performance evaluations in 
promotion decisions (Grabner and Moers 2013; Demeré, Krishnan, Sedatole and Woods 2016; 
Chan 2018), recognizing that current performance does not always provide perfect information 
about employees’ suitability for promotion (Baker et al. 1988). In order to avoid promoting 
employees to a level of incompetence, when making promotion decisions, managers must not 
only consider how employees perform at their current level of employment but also whether they 
have the right skills, experience and aptitude to perform well at the subsequent level of 
employment (Baker et al. 1988). To assess such characteristics, promotions are typically 
determined using a discretionary approach (Prendergast 1999). Certain characteristics, outside of 
the current job performance, are important in promotability evaluations. For example, previous 
challenging job experiences (De Pater, Van Vianed, Bechtoldt and Klehe 2009), employee 
ability and motivation (O’Reilly and Chatman 1994), organizational citizenship behaviour (Hui, 
Lam and Law 2000) and a proactive personality (Seibert, Crant and Kraimer 1999) are all factors 
that matter in promotion evaluations.   
Research in management accounting provides evidence about the role of current 
performance measures in promotion evaluations. In a study of division managers, current 
performance metrics, such as return on assets, are used to determine promotions (Cichello, Fee, 
Hadlock and Sonti 2009). That said, there is evidence to suggest that when employees’ tasks 
differ upon promotion, current performance evaluations become less important. For example, 
managers at a multinational bank place less weight on current objective measures of performance 
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in favour of subjective evaluations of employees’ ability (Grabner and Moers 2013). Further, 
experimental research finds that the use of current performance evaluations can depend on 
whether they are determined using relative performance information (Chan 2018). Specifically, 
this study provides evidence that when tasks upon promotion require higher level ability and 
workers are uncertain about the promotion rule, out of concerns of fairness that are salient in a 
relative performance information environment, managers are more likely to promote the 
employee with the higher level of current performance rather than the employee who is best 
suited for the promotive task. Moreover, evidence from the field at an internal audit firm finds 
that relative performance information is indeed used in promotion decisions, and its use leads to 
an increase in performance (Demeré et al. 2016).  
 In summary, Section 2.4 Subjectivity and Reward Purpose shows that subjectivity is used 
in the determination of both bonus rewards and promotion rewards and that it can be applied 




In this chapter, I first review the relevant literature that examines subjectivity in 
performance evaluations and compensation contacting and explain how managers can make both 
intentional and unintentional inaccurate subjective evaluations. I then describe the general role of 
heuristic theory and its relationship to uncertain judgments of quality. This review suggests that 
research outside of accounting provides evidence that judgments of quality are influenced by 
factors that provide no relevant information about quality itself. Finally, I review research on the 
role subjectivity plays in managers’ bonus and promotion decisions and highlight that subjective 
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information is often incorporated differently in assessments of promotions versus bonuses. In 
Chapter 3, I will examine this issue in further detail in the development of my hypotheses.  
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 In this chapter, I draw on attribute substitution theory to explain why work-day duration 
may be used in evaluations of subjective output quality. I then use existing research to explain 
why its use in the evaluations of subjective output quality might differ, depending on whether the 
purpose of the performance reward is a bonus or a promotion. My objective is to identify 
whether a contextual cue that provides no information about subjective output quality influences 
its evaluation. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes professional employees. 
Section 3.3 uses attribute substitution theory to explain why work-day duration may influence 
evaluations of subjective output quality. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 develop predictions about the 
relationship between work-day duration and bonus rewards and between work-day duration and 
promotion rewards, when output quality is good. In Section 3.6, I develop predictions to examine 
whether the effects persist when output quality is less than good. The chapter is summarized in 
Section 3.7.  
 
3.2 Professional Employees 
 
In this study I focus on subjective performance evaluations of professional employees. 
Professional employees are “non-executive employees with significant managerial or 
professional experience who service in functions without specific responsibility for generating 
sales or the overall performance of a major organizational unit, such as a division or the entire 
firm” (Baik et al. 2016, 34). Importantly, professional employees are routinely evaluated using 
subjective (rather than objective) performance measures because most of the professional 
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employees’ work is difficult to evaluate objectively. In my research, I examine the subjective 
measurement of the work produced by professional employees.  
 
3.3 The Role of Work-Day Duration in Subjective Evaluations of Output Quality 
 
Due to the subjective nature of the output quality evaluations, evaluators may have 
difficulty making assessments because of uncertainty or vagueness. As noted in Chapter 2, 
attribute substitution theory proposes that when a target attribute is difficult to judge, a heuristic 
attribute is easily available, and because the heuristic attribute will not be rejected by System II 
thinking, the heuristic attribute will be used to replace the target attribute in the individuals’ 
evaluation process (Kahneman and Frederick 2002).  
In my study, I examine a setting where the target attribute is output quality and the 
heuristic attribute is work-day duration. All three conditions necessary for attribute substitution 
to occur (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) are satisfied. First, the target attribute (i.e., output 
quality) is relatively inaccessible because there is no objective performance measure to evaluate 
quality against. Second, the heuristic attribute readily comes to mind because work-day duration 
(i.e., the average amount of time professional employees spend at work relative to other 
professional employees) is easily observed and therefore should easily come to mind. Third, 
given the well-established relationship of effort as a determinant of performance (e.g., Awasthi 
and Pratt 1990; Hannan, McPhee, Newman and Tafkov 2013; Hecht et al. 2018; Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002), it is unlikely that the heuristic attribute (i.e., work-day duration) will be rejected 
as a property of the target attribute (i.e., output quality). 
An important assumption made in my study is that work-day duration is a heuristic 
attribute that does not convey reliable information about the target attribute of output quality.  
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Prior research suggests that visible commitment (i.e., staying late and working long hours) is a 
job focused impression management strategy used by employees to influence their managers 
(Singh, Kumra and Vinnicome 2002), but does not always have a positive effect (Ferris, Judge, 
Rowland and Fitzgibbons 1994). Specifically, when employees engage in job-focused influence 
tactics such as staying late and working long hours, it leads to lower levels of supervisor affect 
resulting in lower evalautions of performance (Ferris et al. 1994). Normatively speaking, 
evaluators should not allow work-day duration to influence their output quality evaluations 
because there is no deterministic relationship between work-day duration and output quality. 
Specifically, holding the quality of output constant, employees can work intensely and finish 
their assigned tasks in a short amount of time or employees can work less intensely and finish 
their tasks in a longer amount of time.  
Managers adopt different schemas when evaluating contextual cues (such as work-day 
duration) in subjective evaluations, depending on the purpose of the evaluation (Bol and Leiby 
2018). To examine the influence of work-day duration on subjective evaluations, I examine two 
different purposes of evaluation: bonus or promotion. I will discuss the joint effects of work-day 
duration in bonus rewards in Section 3.4 and in promotion rewards in Section 3.5. 
 
3.4 Work-Day Duration and Bonus Rewards  
 
Prior research indicates that when employees display facetime at work (i.e., work-day 
duration), they are viewed as more dependable and committed, which serves as a signal that they 
could be more hardworking (Elsbach et al. 2010). If professional employees work shorter hours 
compared to other professional employees, they may be perceived as less hardworking. This may 
indicate to managers that professional employees are less deserving of a bonus if they work 
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shorter hours compared to when they work the same duration as other employees. This is 
because bonuses are intended to motivate and reward performance for the current period (Baker 
et al. 1988; Prendergast 1999). When evaluating this output, the heuristic attribute of work-day 
duration will likely replace the target attribute of output quality. Therefore, I propose that when 
professional employees work a short work-day duration compared to other employees, managers 
are likely to evaluate output quality as lower compared to professional employees who work an 
equal work-day duration compared to other employees. Stated formally: 
H1: When the performance reward is a bonus, managers’ evaluations of employees’ 
output will be lower when the employees’ work-day duration is shorter relative to other 
employees than when the employees’ work-day duration is equal to other employees.  
 
3.5 Work-Day Duration and Promotion Rewards 
 
Promotion evaluations differ from bonus evaluations because they not only incentivize 
employees (e.g., employees may be more likely to work hard in order to earn the pay raise, 
prestige and status that accompany a change in job title) but also serve as a sorting tool (e.g., 
employees with specific individual characteristics are matched with the jobs of the next level) 
(Baker et al. 1988; Prendergast 1993; Gibbs 1995).6 Research that examines the use of 
subjectivity in performance evaluations primarily does so in settings where the purpose of the 
evaluation is to assess current-period performance of employees and related bonus decisions 
(e.g., Ederhof 2010; Bailey et al. 2011; Maas et al. 2012; Bol et al. 2015; Majerczyk and Thomas 
2017; Arnold et al. 2018) rather than to make promotion decisions. Although performance 
evaluation related to promotion has long been identified as an area where research is lacking 
 
6 Similar to prior research (e.g., Chan 2018), my experiments examine a setting that does not define a promotion rule 
(i.e., what skills are required for promotion). As such, I do not define what the promotion criteria is, nor do I define 
what the promotive task will be.  
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(Prendergast 1999; Bol 2008), research in this area is still scarce (exceptions include: Campbell 
2008; Grabner and Moers 2013; Bol and Leiby 2018; Chan 2018; Chan and Thornock 2019).   
Limited empirical research provides evidence that information is used differently in 
promotion decisions compared to other purposes of performance evaluation (Campbell 2008; 
Grabner and Moers 2013). These differences can occur because non-financial information is 
given more weight in promotion decisions, as it provides incremental information about how 
employees will perform at the next level (Campbell 2008). Alternatively, they can occur when 
current performance is not an important determinant of performance after promotion, in which 
case subjective indications of ability become much more relevant (Grabner and Moers 2013). 
Recent research provides insight into how information is used differently in promotion decisions: 
When incorporating informative non-contractible information into evaluations, managers rely on 
different cognitive schemas to interpret the information, which results in different outcomes (Bol 
and Leiby 2018). In their setting, different schemas are likely to occur because promotion 
evaluations need to consider employees’ readiness for the next job level, whereas performance 
assessments need only to consider employees’ contributions to their current role. 
Building on this stream of research, I propose that relative work-day duration influences 
the subjective evaluation of output quality in promotion decisions differently from bonus 
decisions. When evaluators are making promotion decisions, they must consider how suitable 
professional employees are for the requirements of the next level (Baker et al. 1988). To make 
suitability assessments, qualitative characteristics are important in evaluations of promotability 
(e.g., O’Reilly and Chatman 1994; Seibert et al. 1999; Hui et al. 2000; De Pater et al. 2009). 
Therefore, a short work-day duration is likely to not only signal that employees are less 
hardworking (a less desirable characteristic for promotability), it could also provide a positive 
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signal that is related to their suitability for promotion. Specifically, professional employees who 
display a shorter work-day duration relative to other employees and produce good quality work 
may signal that they are more efficient compared to their workplace peers. This signal of 
efficiency provides incremental information that professional employees may be suitable for 
promotion in that efficient individuals are more likely to adapt to the next level of job (e.g., they 
can quickly acquire new skills required). Provided that the heuristic attribute of work-day 
duration replaces the target attribute of output quality, evaluators will provide more positive 
subjective evaluations to these employees’ output compared to that of their workplace peers. 
Stated formally: 
H2: When the performance reward is a promotion, managers’ evaluations of output will 
be higher when the employees’ work-day duration is shorter relative to other employees 




3.6 Moderate Quality Subjective Output 
 
I further examine an important boundary condition identified in the development of 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In the preceding sections, I examine the joint effects of work-
day duration and the purpose of the performance reward for good quality output. In this section, I 
examine whether these effects will persist for moderate quality output. This boundary condition 
is important to study because, in practice, managers often need to evaluate output that is of lesser 
quality.  
 Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, when professional employees work a 
short work-day duration and produce moderate quality output, they will be perceived as less 
hardworking than their equal work-day duration peers. Being perceived as less hardworking will 
negatively affect the evaluations of output quality, whether they are considered for a bonus 
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reward or a promotion. Different from Hypothesis 2, however, when professional employees 
work a short work-day duration and produce moderate quality output, they will not be perceived 
to be more efficient than their equal work-day duration counterparts. As efficiency is an 
important characteristic is promotion decisions, evaluations of output for short work-day 
duration employees will not be higher compared to equal work-day duration employees. I 
propose H3 in alternative form and H4 in null from as follows: 
H3: When output quality is moderate and the performance reward is a bonus, managers’ 
evaluations of employees’ output will be lower when the employees’ work-day duration 
is shorter relative to other employees than when the employees’ work-day duration is 
equal to other employees.  
 
H4: When output quality is moderate and the performance reward is a promotion, 
managers’ evaluations of output will not be higher when the employees’ work-day 
duration is shorter relative to other employees than when the employees’ work-day 




Based on existing theory and research from economics, psychology and accounting, this 
chapter develops four hypotheses. The objective of this research is to examine whether the easily 
observed, non-informative, work-day duration cue influences subjective evaluations of output 
quality, depending on whether the evaluations are for the purpose of determining bonus rewards 
versus promotion rewards.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Design Overview 
 
I test my hypotheses by using two separate experiments. Both experiments employ a 2 x 
2 between-participants design where I manipulate two levels of relative work-day duration (short 
and equal) and two levels of reward purpose (bonus and promotion). The experiments only differ 
by the quality of subjective output produced by a professional employee. Experiment One tests 
the set of hypotheses presented in Section 3.4 Work-Day Duration and Bonus Rewards and 3.5 
Work-Day Duration and Promotion Rewards, which examine subjective output of good quality. 
Experiment Two tests the set of hypotheses presented in Section 3.6 Moderate Quality 
Subjective Output, which examine subjective output of moderate quality.  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss details of the simulation 
and the experimental design, respectively. Section 4.4 describes the dependent, independent and 
other measured variables. This chapter concludes in Section 4.5.  
 




Participants assume the role of a Supervising Manager at a consulting company. They 
first read a short description that provides important background information. Specifically, they 
read that the company they work for is a consulting firm that provides business advice to a wide 
range of companies across the United States. They learn about two types of employees that work 
at the company: Analysts and Supervising Managers. Analysts work directly with clients that 
require business advice about a problem they are facing. The Analysts’ responsibility is to think 
critically about the problem and summarize their thoughts in a detailed memo. Supervising 
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Managers are responsible for evaluating the memo provided by an Analyst, revise it and send it 
off to the client requesting business advice. After reading the background information, 
participants are told that their main task as a Supervising Manager is to make an overall 
evaluation of output quality of the memo. In order to ensure that participants understand the 
required task, they complete a short comprehension quiz. Participants then make evaluations of 
output quality and respond to several post-experimental and demographic questions. The 
experimental procedures are shown in Figure 1. 
 
4.2.2 Quality of the Memo   
 
 The memo the participants are asked to evaluate is a four-paragrah, approximately 450-
word response to a business problem about a new product launch.7 The memo represents the 
subjective nature of the work prepared by professional employees because its quality is not easily 
quantifiable or objectively measured. The only difference between the memo used in Experiment 
One and Experiment Two is the quality of the Analysts’ work. The high-quality memo, used in 
Experiment One, is a highly ranked (i.e., would earn a score of 6/6) GMAT essay response 
provided in Learning Express’s Exam Success Guide (Chesla and Schultz 2007). The lower 
quality memo is an adapted version of the same essay where the expression of ideas is not well 
organized and in some cases does not use relevant supporting reasons and examples. To ensure 
that the memo used in Experiment One is of good quality and that the memo used in Experiment 
Two is of significantly lower quality, two validation tests are performed. The details of the 
validation tests are presented in Section 5.3 Validation Tests.  
 
 
7The memo in Experiment One is 452 words and the memo in Experiment Two is 454 words. 
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4.2.3 Participants  
 
 Participants in both experiments are online labour market participants (who have 
professional working experience). Online labour market participants are considered to be highly 
reliable (Farrell, Grenier and Leiby 2017) and allow researchers to access participants with 
specific attributes (Leiby, Rennekamp and Trotman 2019). I recruit 156 working professionals in 
Experiment One and 165 working professionals in Experiment Two.8  
Participants in both experiments are recruited using Prolific. Prolific is a web-based 
participant pool whose mission is to make trustworthy data more accessible (Prolific n.d.) and is 
used by other researchers in accounting (e.g., Wynes 2018; Murphy, Wynes, Hahn and Devine 
2020). The data quality from participants on Prolific is comparable to Amazon Mechanical Turk; 
however, the participant pool is more diverse (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat and Acquisti 2017).  
Similar to other accounting research studies, the use of online participants allows me to 
pre-screen participants with specific experience (e.g., Wynes 2018; Brasel, Doxey, Grenier and 
Reffett 2016), which effectively allows matching of the participants with the research question 
(Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson 2002). Using Proflic’s pre-established filters I am able to draw 
from a heterogeneous population to pre-screen and recruit participants who have supervisory 
experience. This pre-screen is important because the experimental task requires participants to 
put themselves in a supervisory role and previous supervisory experience allows them to better 
adopt the role. In Prolific, I employ the following filter to pre-screen participants based on their 
 
8Originally, I recruit 200 working professionals in Experiment One and 200 working professionals in Experiment 
Two. Of the 200 responses, I exclude from the main results data from 44 participants in Experiment One and 35 
participants in Experiment Two. These participants are excluded if they do not have the requisite supervisory 
experience or if they fail the reading comprehension checks. Analyses of the 44 excluded participants in Experiment 
One and 35 excluded participants in Experiment Two are provided in Section 5.6.1 Excluded Participants. 
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previous supervisory experience: “At work, do you have supervisory responsibilities? In other 
words, do you have the authority to give instruction to subordinates?” I also pre-screen 
participants to ensure they reside in North America and have not participated in any of my 
previous studies that use the same task. A full list of the filters I use to pre-screen participants is 
shown in Table 1. I address potential concerns that participants do not have the requisite 
experience (i.e., did not answer Prolific’s pre-screen questions correctly) by asking follow-up 
questions within my study that make it difficult for participants to fake their qualifications (Leiby 
et al. 2019). For example, rather than asking directly “Do you have supervisory experience?” I 
ask, “How many employees have you supervised?” A full list of the follow-up questions I ask is 
shown in Table 1.  
 
4.2.4 Participant Compensation 
 
The experiment is expected to take no longer than 20 minutes to complete and 
participants are awarded £2.00 upon completion of the study. Prolific requires that experimenters 
pay participants no less than £5.00/per hour. When tasks are intrinsically motivating, prior 
research provides guidance that online worker-participants should be paid a relatively higher flat 
wage (Farrell et al. 2017). I set the wage at a rate of £2.00 for 20 minutes because it translates to 
£6.00/hour, which is a wage that is higher than the minimum wage required by Prolific. I 
incentivize participants to pay close attention for the full duration of the experiment by including 
five attention checks scattered throughout the study (Chandler, Mueller and Paolacci 2014; 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko 2009). Participants are able to earn an additional £0.10 per 
attention check they answer correctly. 
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4.3 Experimental Design 
 
 In both experiments, I employ a 2 x 2 between-participants design where I manipulate 
two independent variables: work-day duration and reward purpose. Experiment One tests H1 and 
H2 that examine the joint effects of work-day duration and reward purpose when subjective 
output quality is good. Experiment Two tests H3 and H4 that examine the joint effects of work-
day duration and reward purpose when subjective output quality is moderate. 
 
4.3.1 Qualtrics and the Experimental Instrument 
 
My experiment is programmed in Qualtrics and the URL is distributed to participants in 
Prolific’s online participant pool. Using Qualtrics’ randomizer feature, participants are randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions: 1. Short work-day duration and bonus 
reward, 2. Short work-day duration and promotion reward, 3. Equal work-day duration and 
bonus reward, 4. Equal work-day duration and promotion reward. The experimental instrument 
is shown in Appendix 1.  
 
4.3.2 Work-Day Duration 
 
The first independent variable is work-day duration (Work-Day Duration). Participants 
are randomly assigned to evaluate the output quality of an employee that works either a short 
work-day duration relative to their workplace peers or an equal work-day duration relative to 
their workplace peers. As 9am–5pm is a standard work-day accepted by North American 
standards, I describe a short work-day duration as working 9am–3pm, compared to workplace 
peers who work 9am–5pm. Equal work-day duration is described as working 9am–5pm, which is 
similar to workplace peers.  
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The description of work-day duration is delivered to participants in two parts. The first 
part highlights the actual work hours that the focal employee (the Analyst) typically works and 
the second part highlights how many hours the Analyst works relative to their workplace peers. 
First, when participants read the details of the experimental task, the hours the Analyst works is 
described to them in words. In the short work-day duration conditions, participants read, 
“Generally speaking, the Analyst is considered to be a good employee that will often arrive at 
work at 9am and will leave for the day at 3pm.” In the equal work-day duration conditions, 
participants read, “Generally speaking, the Analyst is considered to be a good employee that will 
often arrive at work at 9am and will leave for the day at 5pm.” The bold font is added for 
emphasis. Second, participants receive a picture of the employee time records for all five 
employees (i.e., for the Analyst and their workplace peers). In the short work-day duration 
conditions, they observe that the Analyst works different times relative to their place peers (i.e., 
the Analyst works 9am–3pm while other workplace peers work 9am–5pm). In the equal work-
day duration conditions, they observe that the Analyst works similar times relative to their 
workplace peers (i.e., the Analyst works 9am–5pm while other workplace peers also work 9am–
5pm). The exact manipulation by condition is shown in Appendix 2.  
 
4.3.3 Purpose of the Performance Reward 
 
The second independent variable is the purpose of the performance reward (Purpose). 
Participants are randomly assigned to evaluate the output quality of the Analyst that will help to 
determine whether they will receive a bonus or a promotion reward. Similar to the work-day 
duration independent variable, the description of the purpose of the reward is provided to 
participants when they read the details of the experimental task. In the bonus conditions, 
 45 
participants read, “The evaluation you provide will help to determine the likelihood that the 
Analyst will earn an annual bonus.” In the promotion conditions, participants read, “The 
evaluation you provide will help to determine the likelihood that the Analyst will earn a 
promotion.” The bold font is added for emphasis. The exact manipulation by condition is shown 
in Appendix 2. 
 
4.4 Dependent, Independent and Other Measured Variables 
4.4.1 Subjective Evaluation of Output Quality 
The dependent variable of interest is the subjective evaluation of output quality 
(Subjective Quality). Subjective Quality is measured on a 100-point scale where zero corresponds 
to “poor” and 100 corresponds to “excellent.” Participants are asked to do this in the following 
way: “Your Task: Please rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. Indicate your 
evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” Although I ask participants to 
provide a single rating of Subjective Quality, to help participants make an informed evaluation 
and to be consistent with prior research, I also provide participants with four criteria that, if 
present, form a good quality response memo (Chan and Thornock 2019). Specifically, the four 
criteria to consider in the determination of their overall rating of Subjective Quality are: “1. The 
overall quality of ideas, 2. The organization, development and expression of ideas, 3. The use of 
relevant and supporting reasons and examples and 4. Control over elements of standard written 
English.” These four criteria are the criteria used to evaluate GMAT essays in practice. In my 
study the ratings of these criteria were solicited after the overall rating of Subjective Quality is 
provided to validate the dependent variable (Table 2, Panel A). I perform a bivariate correlation 
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analysis shown in Table 2, Panel B. I find that across both experiments, all four measures 
significantly correlate with the overall rating of quality (where all ρ > 0.55, p < 0.01). 
 
4.4.2 Hardworking and Efficient Measurement 
 
 My theory suggests that work-day duration can signal that employees are hardworking. 
To measure whether work-day duration signals the hardworking characteristic, I created the 
statement “The employee is a hardworking employee” and asked participants to respond on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly 
Agree.”9 To measure whether work-day duration can signal that employees are efficient, 
participants respond to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly 
Agree.”10 
 
4.4.3 Other Measured Variables 
 
 Research in psychology suggests that thinking styles (i.e., rational-analytic versus 
experiential-intuitive) may influence individuals’ heuristic responses (Shiloh, Salton and Sharabi 
2002). To ensure that the effects of my manipulations are not driven by individual differences in 
thinking styles, I measure those individual differences using an adapted version of the Rational-
Experimental Inventory Scale (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier 1996). Specifically, I ask 
participants ten questions on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” 
and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” These individual differences are measured to 
 
9I use 7-point Likert scales because variance is maximized when the scale length is 7 points and all data points are 
labelled (Eutsler and Lang 2015). I use a scale with a range from -3 to +3 in order to ensure the there is a midpoint 
and the scale is perceived as bipolar (i.e., participants either agree or disagree) (Schwarz, Knäuper, Hippler, Noelle-
Neumann and Clark 1991). 
10A discussion of hardworking and efficient is presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. 
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understand whether participants’ thinking style may explain their use of work-day duration. The 
questions are shown in Appendix 3 and the results are shown in Section 5.7 Other Measured 
Variables. 
 
4.4.4 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks 
 
  Similar to previous research that uses online labour market participants, I ensure 
participants attend to the experimental task by scattering incentivized attention checks 
throughout the study (e.g., Wynes 2018; Brasel et al. 2016). Specifically, I ask participants two 
questions related to important details of the experimental manipulation (Chandler et al. 2014). 
After reading about the work-day duration manipulation, I also ask participants to confirm the 
hours that the professional employee works, and after reading about the reward purpose 
manipulation, I ask participants to confirm what the purpose of the quality evaluation is. These 
incentivized attention checks increase statistical power by reducing noise (Libby and Thorne 
2017).  
To ensure participants pay close attention to the response memo (the main part of the 
experimental task), I ask them to recall factual information discussed in the memo (Chandler et 
al. 2014). Two questions are asked after I collect the participants’ responses on the dependent 
variable regarding the response memo. These questions reflect important details of the response 
memo provided. For example, I ask participants to identify the main argument made in the 
response memo.  
To help validate the quality of the data, I ask one instructional attention check question in 
the middle of the study that specifically measures whether participants are reading the 
instructions carefully (Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips and Vansant 2014; Oppenheimer 
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et al. 2009). This question simply requires participants to follow the instructions and select a 
specific answer choice (i.e., selecting answer choice c).  
The above questions are shown in Appendix 4, and related results are reported in Section 
5.6 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks. 
  
4.4.5 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo 
 
To guard against perceptions about the simulation task influencing the experimental 
results, participants are asked on a 7-point Likert scale (where -3 corresponds to “Strongly 
Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree”) whether they enjoyed reading the memo and 
the topic of the memo, the writing style of the Analyst and whether they have a strong opinion 
about the business issue. Related results are shown in Section 5.4 Participants’ Perceptions of the 
Response Memo.  
 
4.5 Summary  
 
  In two experiments, I employ a 2 x 2 between-participants design, to test whether relative 
work-day duration and the purpose of the performance reward affect Supervising Managers’ 
evaluations of subjective output of good and moderate quality. The next chapter presents the 
results of both experiments.  
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 In this chapter, I provide the results of Experiment One and Experiment Two. I begin in 
Section 5.2 by reporting the demographic information about the participants. Section 5.3 reports 
on the validation tests and Section 5.4 reports on participants’ perceptions of the response 
memos. My test of the hypotheses is performed in Section 5.5. Specifically, Section 5.5.1 
examines how Work-Day Duration and the Purpose of the performance reward affect subjective 
evaluations of good output quality (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Whereas Section 5.5.3 examines how 
Work-Day Duration and the Purpose of the performance reward affect subjective evaluations of 
moderate output quality (Hypotheses 3 and 4). Section 5.6 reports the results of the task 
understanding, reading comprehension and participants’ attention checks, and Section 5.7 reports 
other measured variables. The chapter concludes in Section 5.8. 
 
5.2 Demographic Information about Participants 
 
I recruit 156 participants in Experiment One and 165 participants in Experiment Two.11 
On average, participants are 36.31 (Experiment One) and 37.27 (Experiment Two) years old, 
have an average of 14.23 (Experiment One) and 15.94 (Experiment Two) years of work 
experience, and have supervised 24.70 (Experiment One) and 44.13 (Experiment Two) 
employees. In addition, 93% (Experiment One) and 92% (Experiment Two) have not taken the 
 
11I initially recruit 200 participants in Experiment One and 200 participants in Experiment Two. In the formal tests 
of my hypotheses, I exclude 44 participants in Experiment One and 35 participants in Experiment Two for not 
having the requisite experience or for failing to pay sufficient attention during the study. A full analysis of excluded 
participants is shown in Section 5.6.1 Excluded Participants. In the rest of this chapter, my analysis includes the 
responses from 156 participants in Experiment One and 165 participants in Experiment Two. 
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GMAT, and 33% (Experiment One) and 51% (Experiment Two) are female. Participant 
background information is shown in Table 3.  
To check the effectiveness of randomization, I perform a multivariate analysis of 
covariance (MANOVA) for continuous variables (age, work experience, number of supervised 
employees and education) and a cross-tabulation analysis for non-continuous variables (gender 
and previous GMAT experience), between experimental conditions. Results of the MANOVA 
(untabulated) show that age, work experience, number of supervised employees and education do 
not significantly differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.31, p = 0.87, 
Experiment One; F = 0.24, p = 0.91, Experiment Two), Purpose (F = 0.81, p = 0.52, Experiment 
One; F = 1.45, p = 0.22, Experiment Two) and the interaction of Work-Day Duration and 
Purpose (F = 1.57, p = 0.18, Experiment One; F = 1.24, p = 0.30, Experiment Two)12. Results of 
the cross-tabulation analysis (untabulated) shows that gender does not differ between conditions 
for Work-Day Duration (χ²(1) = 0.32, p = 0.57, Experiment One; χ²(2) = 2.87, p = 0.24, 
Experiment Two) or Purpose (χ²(1) = 1.05, p = 0.31, Experiment One; χ²(2) = 3.49, p = 0.18, 
Experiment Two). Results (untabulated) also show that previous experience with the GMAT 
does not differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (χ²(1) = 0.72, p = 0.40, Experiment 
One; χ²(1) = 0.38, p = 0.54, Experiment Two) or Purpose (χ²(1) = 0.34, p = 0.56, Experiment 
One; χ²(1) = 0.16 p = 0.69, Experiment Two). Thus, randomization appears to be effective.  
For both experiments, I perform follow-up analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests where 
age, work experience, number of supervised employees and education are dependent variables 
and Work-Day Duration and Purpose are independent variables. In Experiment One, results 
 
12 One-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed p-values are used for non-directional 




(untabulated) show for all dependent variables, the effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and 
the interaction of Work-Day Duration is not significant (where all F < 1.70 and all  p > 0.19) 
with the exception of the interaction of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the number of 
supervised employees (F = 3.46, p = 0.07). To address this, I perform an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) with Subjective Quality as the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose 
as the independent variables and the number of supervised employees as a covariate, shown in 
Table 4, Panel A. I find, when the number of supervised employees is included as a single 
covariate in the test of hypotheses, statistical inferences do not differ. Specifically, the interaction 
between Work-Day Duration and Purpose remains significant (F = 3.00, p = 0.09). Therefore, I 
exclude it as a covariate in the test of hypotheses. 
 In Experiment Two, results (untabulated) of the follow-up ANOVA tests indicate that for 
all dependent variables the effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and the interaction of Work-
Day Duration and Purpose is not significant (where all F < 1.75 and all p > 0.19) with the 
exception of the effect of Purpose on age (F = 4.07, p = 0.05) and work experience (F = 3.34, p = 
0.07). To address this, I perform an ANCOVA with Subjective Quality as the dependent variable, 
Work-Day Duration and Purpose as the independent variables, and age and work experience as 
covariates, shown in Table 4, Panel B. I find, when age and work experience are included as 
covariates in the test of hypotheses, statistical inferences do not differ. Specifically, the 
interaction between Duration and Purpose remains insignificant (F = 1.86, p = 0.17). Therefore, 
I exclude them both as covariates in the test of hypotheses.13 
 
13 I also perform a supplemental regression analysis using the two dichotomous variables (gender and experience 
with the GMAT), to verify that the results do not differ when they are included as control variables. In the 
regression, Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose are the independent 
variables and gender and experience with the GMAT are control variables. The regression analysis shows the 
coefficients in Experiment One for gender (b = 0.01, t = 0.17, p = 0.87, untabulated) and experience with GMAT (b 
= 0.05, t = 0.59, p = 0.56, untabulated) and those in Experiment Two for gender (b = 0.01, t = 0.16, p = 0.87, 
 52 
 
5.3 Validation Tests  
 
I run two validation tests. The purpose of the first validation test is to identify output that 
is of good quality. This validation test relates only to the response memo in Experiment One and 
is administered prior to the first experiment. During this validation test, I pre-test four different 
response memos on various different topics. I recruit 99 online labour market participants via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants are paid USD$3.50 for 30 minutes of work. They are 
filtered based on their education level (must have a bachelor’s degree or higher), must have a 
HIT approval rate of 95% or higher and they must reside in North America. Originally, I recruit 
147 participants. To ensure that the quality of responses is acceptable, I eliminate observations 
based on two criteria. First, participants must have answered at least one attention check 
correctly. Second, participants must have spent a realistic amount of time (i.e., at least ten 
minutes) completing the study.14 
Participants are required to evaluate the output quality for two out of four response 
memos. Participants are randomly assigned to one of 12 different conditions. Six conditions are 
required to exhaust all possible combinations of two response memos, which is then doubled to 
12 conditions to manipulate the order of the two memos. However, as participants in my formal 
experiments evaluate the output quality of a single employee, I only examine the scores assigned 
to the first response memo that all participants in the validation test observe. By examining the 
first response memo observed, I eliminate effects that may result from joint evaluations (i.e., 
 
untabulated) and experience with the GMAT (b = 0.03, t = 0.34, p = 0.74, untabulated) are not significant. The 
coefficients in Experiment One for the interaction between Duration and Purpose remain significant (b = -0.76, t = -
2.15, p = 0.03, untabulated) and the coefficients in Experiment Two for the interaction between Duration and 
Purpose remain insignificant (b = -0.44, t = -1.23, p = 0.22, untabulated). 
 
14 31 participants were eliminated because they did not answer at least one attention check correctly.  An additional 
17 participants were eliminated because they did not spend at least 10 minutes completing the study. 
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comparing the second response memo to the first response memo). Means and standard 
deviations of the scored Subjective Quality are shown in Table 5. The memo that scored the 
highest mean is response memo two (m = 91.11, s.d. = 8.08) which is significantly higher than 
response memo one (m = 81.09, s.d. = 13.07, t = 3.31, p < 0.01, untabulated), response memo 
three (m = 81.26, s.d. = 10.97, t = 3.65, p < 0.01, untabulated) and response memo four (m = 
78.65, s.d. = 14.52, t = 3.88, p < 0.01, untabulated). In addition to earning the highest mean 
score, response memo two also presents a realistic business problem. Therefore, I select response 
memo two to be used in Experiment One.  
The second validation test is administered subsequent to Experiment One and prior to 
Experiment Two. This validation test is to ensure that the response memo in Experiment One is 
of significantly higher quality (i.e., good) than the response memo in Experiment Two (i.e., 
moderate). I recruit 99 participants on Prolific to complete this validation test. To ensure that the 
participants in the validation test are comparable to those in the formal experiment, I pre-screen 
participants based on their highest level of education completed (a bachelor’s degree or higher), 
their country of residence (Canada or the United States) and whether they had participated in a 
previous study with the same experimental task. Further, participants are pre-screened on the 
basis that they did not have managerial experience.15 This filter is applied to ensure I did not tap 
into the limited participant pool of participants with supervisory experience available for the 
formal study. As these participants are required to hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, I believe 
they have the requisite skills to make basic judgments of quality outside of a workplace setting.  
 
15Although I pre-screened participants who did not have managerial experience in this validation test, some 
participants indicated that they had previous experience evaluating employee performance. Specifically, 83% of 
respondents have provided a performance evaluation for between 0 and 5 employees, 6.1% have provided a 
performance evaluation for between 6 and 10 employees, 3% have provided a performance evaluation for between 
10 and 15 employees and 7% have provided a performance evaluation for greater than 15 employees. I examine 
whether this performance evaluation experience influences their evaluations of the response memo, and find that it 
does not (F = 0.17, p = 0.68, untabulated). 
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Using the same criteria as in the formal tests, participants assume the role of a 
Supervising Manager and are required to evaluate response memos of two Analysts. One 
response memo is of good quality and the other response memo is of moderate quality. The order 
of presentation is manipulated, and 51 participants receive the good quality memo first and 48 
participants receive the moderate quality memo first. To eliminate the effects of joint evaluations 
(i.e., comparing the second response memo to the first response memo), I compare the quality 
evaluation scores of participants who receive the good quality memo first to the quality 
evaluation scores of participants who receive the moderate quality memo first. Descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 6, Panel A. The average score reported on the good quality response 
was 82.02 (s.d. = 13.46) and the average score on the moderate quality response was 72.00 (s.d. 
= 18.73). I perform an ANOVA to determine whether the two average scores are significantly 
different. Results are shown in Table 6, Panel B and indicate that the two response memo scores 
are significantly different from each other (F = 9.43, p < 0.01). From this validation test, I 
conclude that the response memo provided in Experiment One is significantly better (i.e., is of 
good quality) than the response memo provided in Experiment Two (i.e., is of moderate quality). 
 
5.4 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo 
 
 As described in Section 4.4.5 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo, 
participants are asked four questions about their perceptions of the simulation on a 7-point Likert 
scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
Participants’ perceptions about the response memo are shown in Table 7 (Experiment One) and 
Table 8 (Experiment Two). I perform a one-sample t-test to examine whether participants 
perceptions differed from the neutral point of zero shown in Table 7, Panel C (Experiment One) 
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and Table 8, Panel C (Experiment Two). Participants in Experiment One enjoyed reading the 
response memo (m = 1.78, s.d. = 1.03, t = 21.6, p < 0.01), thought the Analyst had a good 
writing style (m = 1.54, s.d. = 1.18, t = 16.40, p < 0.01), enjoyed the topic (m = 1.63, s.d., = 1.06, 
t = 19.28, p < 0.01), and had a strong opinion about the problem/issue presented (m = 0.37, s.d. = 
1.64, t = 2.78, p = 0.01). Participants in Experiment Two enjoyed reading the response memo (m 
= 0.25, s.d. = 1.72, t = 1.91, p = 0.06) and thought the Analyst had a good writing style (m = 
0.75, s.d. = 1.45, t = 6.66, p < 0.01) but did not have a strong opinion about the problem/issue 
presented (m = -0.34, s.d. = 1.54, t = -2.82, p = 0.01) and were neutral about their perceptions of 
the topic (m = -0.03, s.d. = 2.00, t = -0.19, p = 0.85). It is likely that participants in Experiment 
One reported higher scores than in Experiment Two because the output quality in Experiment 
One was superior (i.e., it was a more coherent and easier to follow passage of writing).  
As these questions are all correlated (see Table 7, Panel B, Experiment One and Table 8, 
Panel B, Experiment Two), I use a MANOVA to analyse whether these four perception variables 
differ between experimental conditions. In Experiment One, I find that these four variables do 
not differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.50, p = 0.73, untabulated) or 
Purpose (F = 0.59, p = 0.67, untabulated). However, I do find that the interaction of Duration 
and Purpose to be significant (F = 2.96. p = 0.02, untabulated). This suggests that at least one of 
the four perception variables is affected by the experimental manipulations. A test of between 
subjects effects indicates that Enjoy Topic (“I enjoyed reading about the topic in the memo”) is 
marginally significantly influenced by the interaction of Duration and Purpose (F = 7.15, p = 
0.08, untabulated).16 I subsequently perform an ANCOVA with Subjective Quality as the 
 
16Specifically, participants in the bonus reward conditions enjoyed the topic of the response memo less when the 
Analyst worked a short duration (m = 1.44; s.d. = 1.08) compared to an equal duration (m = 1.74; s.d. = 1.03). In 
contrast, participants in the promotion conditions enjoyed the topic of the response memo more when the Analyst 
worked a short duration (m = 1.95; s.d. = 0.73) compared to an equal duration (m = 1.36; s.d. = 1.25).  
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dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose as the independent variables and Enjoy 
Topic as the covariate. When Enjoy Topic is included as a covariate, the interaction between 
Duration and Purpose is no longer significant (F = 1.18, p = 0.28, untabulated). This change of 
inference could be caused by a spillover effect. Specifically, since Enjoy Topic is measured after 
the dependent variable, the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable could 
spill over to Enjoy Topic, causing a correlation between them (ρ = 0.49, p < 0.01). This spillover 
effect would weaken the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable while 
controlling for Enjoy Topic.  
In Experiment Two, the MANOVA shows that the four perception variables do not differ 
between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 1.46, p = 0.22, untabulated), Purpose (F = 1.34, 
p = 0.26, untabulated) or the interaction of Work-Day Duration and Purpose (F = 1.81, p = 0.13, 
untabulated).  
 
5.5 Main Results – Evaluation of Subjective Output 
 
5.5.1 Test of Hypotheses 1 & 2 
 
In this section, I analyse the set of hypotheses tested in Experiment One which examine 
good quality subjective output. The dependent variable of interest is participants’ overall ratings 
of Subjective Quality. I first describe the descriptive statistics for Subjective Quality by condition 
shown in Table 9. I then describe the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shown in 
Table 10, Panel A and the results of the simple effects shown in Table 10, Panel B. 
When the Purpose of the evaluation is a bonus, average ratings of Subjective Quality are 
lower when Work-Day Duration is short (m = 84.82; s.d. = 8.10) compared to when Work-Day 
Duration is equal (m = 87.89; s.d. = 9.33). When the Purpose of the evaluation is a promotion, 
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average ratings of Subjective Quality are higher when Work-Day Duration is short (m = 87.12; 
s.d. = 8.98) compared to when Work-Day Duration is equal (m = 82.93; s.d. = 12.89).  
Together, H1 and H2 predict how short (versus equal) Work-Day Duration influences 
evaluations of Subjective Quality, depending on whether the evaluation is used to determine a 
bonus (H1) or a promotion (H2). To formally evaluate these two hypotheses, I use an ANOVA 
test and follow up with simple effect tests shown in Table 10. Taken together, H1 and H2 predict 
an interaction effect, such that the effect of short Work-Day Duration will depend on the Purpose 
of the performance evaluation. The significant interaction between Work-Day Duration and 
Purpose (F = 5.00, p = 0.03, Table 10, Panel A) provides evidence that the effect of Work-Day 
Duration on evaluations of Subjective Quality depends on the Purpose of performance 
evaluations. There are no significant main effects for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.12, p = 0.73, 
Table 10, Panel A) or Purpose (F = 0.68, p = 0.41, Table 10, Panel A). The follow-up simple 
effect tests further show that, consistent with H1, when short Work-Day Duration professional 
employees are eligible for a bonus, Subjective Quality ratings are marginally lower compared to 
equal Work-Day Duration employees (t = 1.29, p = 0.10, one-tailed, Table 10, Panel B). 
Consistent with H2, when short Work-Day Duration professional employees are eligible for a 
promotion, Subjective Quality ratings are higher compared to equal Work-Day Duration 
professional employees (t = 1.90, p = 0.03, one-tailed, Table 10, Panel B). The results of H1 and 
H2 are also presented in a graphic form in Figure 2. 
 
5.5.2 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2  
 
In the development of H1 & H2, I theorize that when the performance reward is a bonus 
or a promotion, short duration professional employees will be perceived as less Hardworking and 
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not going above and beyond what is required. In Section 4.4.2 Hardworking and Efficient 
Measurement, I describe the statement used to measure Hardworking. Descriptive results of 
Hardworking are shown in Table 11, Panel A. When the performance reward is a bonus, short 
duration employees are perceived as less hardworking (m = 1.29; s.d = 1.23) than equal duration 
employees (m = 2.18; s.d = 0.73). When the performance reward is a promotion, short duration 
employees are also perceived as less hardworking (m = 1.38; s.d = 1.23) than equal duration 
employees (m = 1.95; s.d = 0.85). There is a significant difference (F = 19.57, p < 0.01, Table 
11, Panel B) in the mean Hardworking score for short Work-Day Duration (m = 1.34; s.d = 1.22) 
as compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m = 2.06; s.d = 0.80) across Purpose conditions. 
Therefore, I find preliminary evidence to support my theory that in both bonus and promotion 
decisions, short Work-Day Duration will have a negative influence on the evaluation of 
Subjective Quality because of the perception that they are less Hardworking.  
In the development of H2, I also theorize that when the performance reward is a 
promotion, short Work-Day Duration professional employees will be perceived as more 
efficient. Descriptive results of Efficient are shown in Table 12, Panel A. There is a significant 
difference in the mean Efficient score for short Work-Day Duration (m = 2.19; s.d. = 0.74) as 
compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m = 1.76; s.d. = 0.71) when the performance reward is a 
promotion (t = 2.20, p = 0.02, one-tailed, Table 12, Panel C). Therefore, I find evidence to 
support my theory that in promotion decisions, short Work-Day Duration will have a positive 
influence on the evaluation of Subjective Quality because of perceptions of Efficient. 
Interestingly, when the performance reward is a bonus reward, short Work-Day Duration 
professional employees are not viewed as more efficient; rather, they are viewed as less efficient 
(mean = 1.79; s.d. = 0.88) compared to equal duration professional employees (mean = 2.11; s.d. 
 59 
= 0.89) and the difference is not significant (t = 1.48, p = 0.14, Table 12, Panel C). I do not make 
any a priori predictions on how perceptions of Efficient will affect evaluations of output quality 
when the purpose of the reward is a bonus in the development of H1. That said, this result could 
be because Efficient is not an important characteristic in bonus decisions, and when Work-Day 
Duration is short, negative perceptions of hardworking spill over into perceptions of Efficient.  
 To further examine the relationship between Work-Day Duration, Hardworking, Efficient 
and Subjective Quality, I perform a multi-group path analysis similar to Figure 3. I first divide 
participants into two groups by Purpose: bonus (n = 72) and promotion (n = 84). The error terms 
associated with Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary, and all path coefficients are 
allowed to differ between groups.17 The model fit statistics indicate that the data fits this 
unconstrained model well (Kline 2015). Specifically, the chi-square of the model is insignificant 
(χ²(2) = 3.32, p = 0.19), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.07, the 
Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI) is 0.99, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.98. As the data fits 
the unconstrained model well, I continue my analysis to examine whether perceptions of Work-
Day Duration influence Hardworking and Efficient differently, and whether Hardworking and 
Efficient influence Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance 
evaluation.  
 To understand whether the relationships between variables are different, depending on 
the Purpose of the performance evaluation, I first compare the fully unconstrained model against 
the fully constrained model where all path coefficients are constrained to be the same between 
 
17 When the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two error 
terms is 0.77 (0.57), suggesting that overall the two characteristics of the evaluated employee are positively 
correlated. This finding is consistent with research that examines the halo effect; the phenomenon that arises when 




the bonus and the promotion groups. The constrained model yields a significantly worse fit: 
(Δχ²(4) = 13.40, p = 0.01, untabulated), suggesting that at least one of the path coefficients 
depends on whether the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion. 
I theorize that whether the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a 
promotion, short Work-Day Duration employees will be perceived as less Hardworking. 
Therefore, I do not expect that the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and Hardworking 
and Hardworking and Subjective Quality will be different between the bonus and promotion 
conditions. As expected, the chi-square difference test, comparing the unconstrained model and a 
partially constrained model where these two paths are constrained to be the same between 
groups, suggests that the path coefficients are not statistically different from each other (Δχ²(2) = 
4.18, p = 0.12, untabulated).  
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a promotion, I theorize that short 
duration employees will be perceived as more Efficient, which will result in higher evaluations of 
Subjective Quality. I expect the coefficient between Work-Day Duration and Efficient to be more 
negative (i.e., when duration decreases, participants will perceive the employee to be more 
efficient) and the coefficient between Efficient and Subjective Quality to be greater (i.e., Efficient 
is more important in evaluating the output quality of the employee’s work) in the promotion 
conditions than in the bonus condition. As expected, the chi-square difference test, comparing 
the unconstrained model and a partially constrained model where this path is constrained to be 
the same between groups, suggests that the path coefficients are statistically different from each 
other (Δχ²(2) = 12.21, p < 0.01). 
Collectively, the results show that the optimal model is one where the path coefficient 
between Work-Day Duration and Hardworking and that between Hardworking and Subjective 
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Quality are constrained to be the same between groups while the path coefficients between 
Work-Day Duration and Efficient and between Efficient and Subjective Quality are allowed to 
vary between groups (χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96). The fit 
of this model is not significantly different from the unconstrained model (Δχ²(2) = 4.18, p = 0.12, 
untabulated). All standardized path coefficients for this optimal model are shown in Figure 3 and 
Table 13.  
As shown in Figure 3 and Table 13, the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and 
Hardworking (β = 0.35, SE = 0.16, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and Subjective Quality (β = 
0.38, SE = 0.79, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the coefficients between Work-
Day Duration and Hardworking (β = 0.33, SE = 0.17, p  < 0.001), and Hardworking and 
Subjective Quality (β = 0.29, SE = 0.79, p  < 0.001) in the promotion condition. The coefficient 
between Work-Day Duration and Efficient is more negative in the promotion conditions (β = -
0.20, SE = 0.18, p = 0.05) than in the bonus condition (β = 0.11, SE = 0.17, p = 0.25), and the 
coefficient between Efficient and Subjective Quality is greater in the promotion condition (β = 
0.37, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) than in the bonus condition (β = 0.24, SE = 1.17, p = 0.05).  
In summary, my results suggest that Work-Day Duration influences Subjective Quality, 
depending on whether the nature of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion. The 
subsequent path analysis provides evidence that whether the purpose of the performance 
evaluation is a bonus or promotion when Work-Day Duration increases, employees are perceived 
as more hardworking and, in turn, this positively influences the evaluations of Subjective 
Quality. However, only when the purpose of the performance evaluation is a promotion but not 
when it is a bonus, when Work-Day Duration decreases, employees are viewed as more efficient, 
which in turn positively influences the evaluations of Subjective Quality. 
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5.5.3 Test of Hypotheses 3 & 4 
 
In this section, I analyse the set of hypotheses tested in Experiment Two which examine 
moderate quality subjective output. Consistent with Experiment One and the test of H1 and H2, 
the dependent variable of interest is participants’ overall rating of Subjective Quality. Table 14 
presents descriptive statistics for Subjective Quality by condition. When the Purpose of the 
evaluation is a bonus, average ratings of Subjective Quality are lower when Work-Day Duration 
is short (m = 62.61; s.d. = 31.57) compared to when Work-Day Duration is equal (m = 72.07; 
s.d. = 17.91). When the Purpose of the reward is a promotion, average ratings of Subjective 
Quality are similar whether Work-Day Duration is short (m = 63.50; s.d. = 24.11) or is equal (m 
= 63.91; s.d. = 22.35). This pattern suggests that among the four conditions, the average rating of 
Subjective Quality is only higher when Work-Day Duration is equal, and the Purpose of the 
reward is a bonus. 
Together, H3 and H4 examine whether short Work-Day Duration influences evaluations 
of Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance reward, for 
moderate output quality. I evaluate these two hypotheses using an ANOVA test and follow up 
with a contrast test and simple effect test. Table 15, Panel A, presents the results from the 
ANOVA where Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, and Work-Day Duration and 
Purpose are the independent variables. It shows that the interaction of Work-Day Duration and 
Purpose is not significant (F = 1.42, p = 0.24). The default contrast weights of (+1, -1, -1, -1) are 
more suitable for testing a disordinal interaction as predicted in Experiment One (Buckless and 
Ravenscroft 1990). However, in Experiment Two, the pattern of results suggests that an ordinal 
interaction may exist.  
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Following Buckless and Ravenscroft’s (1990) recommendation, I estimate a planned 
contrast using weights of -1, -1, +3 and -1, where Equal Work-Day Duration/Bonus has a weight 
of +3 and all other conditions have a weight of -1. The planned contrast is significant (t = 2.04, p 
< 0.05, one-tailed; Table 15, Panel B).18 This finding is in line with expectations. When output 
quality is moderate, I expect that when Purpose is a bonus reward, a short Work-Day Duration 
will signal that the employee is less hardworking, leading to lower evaluations of Subjective 
Quality. However, when Purpose is a promotion reward, a short duration will not signal that the 
employee is more efficient, thus not resulting in higher evaluations of Subjective Quality.    
The simple effects analysis presented in Table 15, Panel C shows that when the Purpose 
is a bonus, evaluations of Subjective Quality are significantly lower when Work-Day Duration is 
short compared to when it is equal (t = 1.80, p = 0.04, one-tailed). In comparison, the simple 
effects analysis shows that when the Purpose is a promotion, evaluations of Subjective Quality 
are not significantly different when Work-Day Duration is short compared to when it is equal (t 
= 0.08, p = 0.47, one-tailed). Taken together, I find that when the Purpose of the performance 
reward is a bonus, the results of Experiment Two (H3) are consistent with Experiment One (H1); 
short Work-Day Duration results in lower evaluations of Subjective Quality. However, when the 
Purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, the results of Experiment Two (H4) differ 
from those of Experiment One (H2); short Work-Day Duration does not result in higher 
evaluations of Subjective Quality. The results of H3 and H4 are also presented in a graphic form 
in Figure 4. 
 
 
18The semi-omnibus F-test on the residual between cells variance is insignificant (F = 0.01, p = 0.99) and the 
residual between effect size (q2 = 0.07) indicates that only a limited amount of residual between cells effects remain 
after accounting for the contrast (Guggenmos, Piercey and Agoglia 2017). 
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5.5.4 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 3 & 4 
 
In the development of H3 and H4, I examine whether short Work-Day Duration 
professional employees will be perceived as less Hardworking when output quality is moderate, 
and the performance reward is either a bonus or a promotion. Descriptive results of Hardworking 
are shown in Table 16, Panel A. There is a significant difference in the mean Hardworking score 
for short Work-Day Duration (m = 0.34; s.d. = 1.64) compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m 
= 1.47; s.d. = 1.21) across purpose conditions (F = 26.12, p < 0.01, Table 16, Panel B). These 
results are similar to the results when subjective output quality is good. 
 In the development of H4, I also examine whether short Work-Day Duration professional 
employees will not be perceived as more Efficient when output quality is moderate, and the 
performance reward is a promotion. Descriptive results of Efficient are shown in Table 17, Panel 
A. The interaction of  Work-Day Duration and Purpose is not significant (F = 0.61, p = 0.44, 
Table 17, Panel B), which indicates that in promotion decisions, short duration professional 
employees are not perceived as more efficient when the quality of subjective output is moderate. 
To further examine the relationship between Work-Day Duration, Hardworking, Efficient 
and Subjective Quality, I perform a multi-group path analysis similar to Figure 5. I first divide 
participants into two groups by Purpose: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80). The error terms 
associated with Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary and all path coefficients are 
allowed to differ between groups.19 The model fit statistics indicate that the data fits this fully 
unconstrained model well (Kline 2015). Specifically, the chi-square value of the model is 
insignificant (χ²(2) = 2.29, p = 0.32), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
 
19 When the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two error 
terms is 0.67 (0.70). 
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0.03, the Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI) is < 0.99, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.99. I 
continue my analysis to examine whether perceptions of Work-Day Duration influence 
Hardworking and Efficient differently, and whether Hardworking and Efficient influence 
Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance evaluation.  
 To understand whether the relationships between variables are different, depending on 
the Purpose of the performance evaluation, I compare the fully unconstrained model against a 
fully constrained model where all path coefficients are constrained to be the same between 
groups. These two models do not yield a significantly different fit: (Δχ²(4) = 2.35, p = 0.67, 
untabulated), suggesting that none of the path coefficients depend on whether the Purpose of the 
performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion. As the fully constrained model does not differ 
significantly from the fully unconstrained model, I conclude that the fully constrained model is 
the optimal model (χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA = 0.03, CFI > 0.99, NFI = 0.98). The path 
coefficients derived from this fully constrained model are presented in Figure 5 and Table 18. 
As shown in Figure 5 and Table 18, the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and 
Hardworking (β = 0.37, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and Subjective Quality (β = 
0.41, SE = 1.14, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the coefficients between Work-
Day Duration and Hardworking (β = 0.38, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and 
Subjective Quality (β = 0.41, SE = 1.14, p < 0.001) in the promotion condition. The coefficients 
between Work-Day Duration and Efficient (β = 0.03, SE = 0.22, p = 0.66), and Efficient and 
Subjective Quality (β = 0.38, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the 
coefficients between Work-Day Duration and Efficient (β = 0.03, SE = 0.22, p = 0.66) and 
Efficient and Subjective Quality (β = 0.39, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) in the promotion condition.  
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In summary, the results support the reasoning that in both bonus and promotion 
decisions, when output quality is moderate, employees who work a short Work-Day Duration 
will be perceived as less Hardworking and lead to lower evaluations of subjective output quality. 
Furthermore, it supports the reasoning that in both bonus and promotion decisions, when output 
quality is moderate, employees who work a short Work-Day Duration will not be perceived as 
more efficient and thus will not lead to higher subjective evaluations of output quality.  
 
5.6 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks 
As discussed in Section 4.4.4 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and 
Participants’ Attention Checks, participants are asked two different questions to ensure they 
understand the task and receive the experimental manipulations. The first question relates to the 
work-day duration manipulation and asks participants to confirm the number of hours the 
Analyst spends at work on a typical workday. I observe that 99% of participants respond 
correctly on the first attempt during Experiment One, and 99% of participants respond correctly 
on the first attempt during Experiment Two. The second question relates to the purpose of the 
performance reward manipulation and asks participants to confirm what the purpose of the 
performance reward is. I observe that 95% of participants respond correctly on the first attempt 
during Experiment One, and 97% of participants respond correctly on the first attempt during 
Experiment Two. On all questions, when participants do not answer correctly, they are prompted 
to try the question again. They are not permitted to proceed until the questions are answered 
correctly.  
 Participants are asked two different questions to ensure they carefully read the response 
memo prepared by the Analyst. Both questions are similar in that they ask participants to recall 
important details provided in the response memo. These two reading comprehension questions 
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are asked to ensure that the participants carefully read the memo and do not just assign arbitrary 
evaluation scores (Leiby et al. 2019). In Experiment One, 25 participants did not answer both 
questions correctly and, in Experiment Two, 18 participants did not answer both questions 
correctly.  
 Finally, I ask participants to respond to an additional attention check question. This 
question asks participants to choose box c). In both Experiment One and Experiment Two, 99% 
of participants answered this question correctly.  
 
5.6.1 Excluded Participants  
 
In total, I recruit 200 participants for each of my experiments. Two steps are taken to 
exclude participants from the main analyses: First, with respect to participant engagement, 25 
participants in my first experiment and 18 participants in my second experiment did not answer 
the reading comprehension checks (regarding the response memo) correctly and are excluded 
from the study. Second, participants who did not have the requisite supervisory experience are 
also excluded from my main analyses. Specifically, based on the post experiment questionnaire 
(PEQ) responses, 19 participants in my first experiment and 17 participants in my second 
experiment did not have the requisite experience, and therefore are excluded from the main 
analyses.  
In total 44 participants were excluded from Experiment One, analysed in Sections 5.5.1 
Test of Hypotheses 1 & 2 and 5.5.2 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2, and 35 participants 
were excluded from Experiment Two analysed in Sections 5.5.3 Test of Hypotheses 3 & 4 and 
5.5.4 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 3 & 4. 
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 When including these participants in my analyses, the statistical inferences of my 
hypotheses tests largely remain. The results are presented in Table 19 and Table 20. More 
specifically, in Experiment One, the interaction remains significant (F= 5.52, p = 0.02, Table 19, 
Panel B) and so do the follow-up simple effects of duration on bonus eligible participants (t = 
1.57, p = 0.06, one-tailed, Table 19, Panel C) and the effect of duration on promotion eligible 
participants (t = 1.75, p = 0.04, one-tailed, Table 19, Panel C). In Experiment Two, the 
interaction remains non-significant (F = 1.32, p = 0.25, Table 20, Panel B), the follow-up simple 
effects of duration on bonus eligible participants remains moderately significant (t = 1.37, p = 
0.08, one-tailed, Table 20, Panel C), and the effects of duration on promotion eligible 
participants remains insignificant (t = 0.26, p = 0.40, one-tailed, Table 20, Panel C).  
 
5.7 Other Measured Variables  
 
 As discussed in Section 4.4.3 Other Measured Variables, I ask participants to respond to 
several questions regarding individual differences with respect to their intuitive-experiential and 
analytical-rational thinking styles to ensure that the effects of my manipulations are not driven by 
individual differences. Questions asked are shown in Appendix 3. I perform an exploratory 
factor analysis, a principal axis factor analysis in particular, shown in Table 21, Panel A. I 
perform separate analyses for the need for cognition and the faith in intuition (Epstein et al. 
1996) in both Experiment One and Experiment Two. In the analyses for the need for cognition, I 
find a one factor solution with and eigenvalue of 3.08 and 61.67 % of the variance explained in 
Experiment One and eigenvalue of 3.08 and 61.57% of the variance explained in Experiment 
Two. The five items yield a Cronbach’s α of 0.83 in Experiment One and 0.82 in Experiment 
Two, which indicates a relatively high reliability. In the analyses for faith in intuition, I find a 
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one-factor solution with an eigenvalue of 3.82 and 76.42% of the variance explained in 
Experiment One and an eigenvalue of 4.04 and 80.75% of the variance explained in Experiment 
Two. The five items yield a Cronbach’s α of 0.92 in Experiment One and 0.94 in Experiment 
Two, which indicates a relatively high reliability.  
 I subsequently create one new variable averaging all five items for the need for cognition 
(Need for Cognition) and a second new variable averaging all five items for faith in intuition 
(Faith in Intuition). Means and standard deviations for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition 
are shown in Table 22 (Experiment One) and Table 23 (Experiment Two). Using a MANOVA, I 
examine whether these two individual difference variables differ between experimental 
conditions.  
In Experiment One, I find these two variables do not differ between conditions for Work-
Day Duration (F = 0.30, p = 0.74, untabulated) or the interaction between Work-Day Duration 
and Purpose (F = 2.15, p = 0.12, untabulated). However, they do differ between conditions for 
Purpose (F = 3.08, p = 0.05, untabulated). A follow-up ANOVA shows that this difference is 
caused by the Need for Cognition differing between the two purpose conditions (F = 5.63, p = 
0.02, untabulated). To understand whether this difference influences the effect that Work-Day 
Duration and Purpose have on evaluations of Subjective Quality, I perform an ANCOVA where 
Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose are the 
independent variables and Need for Cognition is the covariate. I find that when Need for 
Cognition is included as a covariate, the effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on 
evaluations of Subjective Quality do not differ from what is presented in Section 5.5.1 Test of 
Hypotheses 1 & 2. Specifically, the main effects of Work-Day Duration (F = 0.05, p = 0.82, 
Table 22, Panel B) and Purpose (F = 0.20, p = 0.65, Table 22, Panel B) remain insignificant and 
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the interaction effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose remains significant (F = 3.83, p = 0.05, 
Table 22, Panel B).  
In Experiment Two, MANOVA results suggest that these two variables do not differ 
between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.76, p = 0.47, untabulated), Purpose (F = 0.47, 
p = 0.63, untabulated) and the interaction between Work-Day Duration and Purpose (F = 0.18, p 




 This chapter provides the results observed in the evaluation of four hypotheses. In 
Experiment One, using output of good quality, I demonstrate that perceptions of work-day 
duration influence evaluations of output quality differently, depending on whether the evaluation 
will help to determine a bonus or a promotion reward. Specifically, in bonus decisions, short 
work-day duration results in lower evaluations of output quality whereas in promotions 
decisions, short work-day duration results in higher evaluations of output quality. Results of the 
path analysis suggests that this occurs because in bonus and promotion decisions, short work-day 
duration signals that employees are less hardworking. However, in promotion decisions, short 
work-day duration signals that employees are more efficient.  
In Experiment Two, I broaden the scope of my analysis by examining a setting where 
output quality is moderate. I find in bonus decisions, a short work-day duration will result in 
lower evaluations of output quality compared to an equal work-day duration, consistent with 
Experiment One. However, in promotion decisions, different from Experiment One, a short 
work-day duration does not result in higher evaluations of output quality compared to an equal 
work-day duration. The findings of Experiment Two suggest that output quality is an important 
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boundary condition to how work-day duration affects Supervising Managers’ subjective 
evaluations when the purpose of the reward is a promotion.  
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I begin this chapter by discussing the tests of hypotheses in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 I 
discuss the limitations of my study and opportunities for future research. Finally, in Section 6.4, I 
provide conclusions.  
 
6.2 Discussion of Hypotheses Testing 
 
In my dissertation, I investigate whether professional employees’ work-day duration 
relative to the workplace norm will impact quality evaluations of subjective output, depending on 
whether the evaluation will help to determine a bonus or a promotion reward. The results of my 
study suggest that when professional employees produce subjective output, work-day duration is 
a non-informative contextual cue that is considered by managers when making quality 
evaluations. My results further suggest that the role of work-day duration depends on the purpose 
of the performance evaluation.  
 In Experiment One, I examine a setting where the evaluated employee produces good 
quality work (as confirmed by a validation test). I compare short work-day duration employees 
(i.e., employees who work short hours relative to the workplace norm) to equal work-day 
duration employees (i.e., employees who work hours equal to the workplace norm). I provide 
evidence to suggest that managers not only use work-day duration in the evaluation of output 
quality, but its use depends on the purpose of the performance evaluation. Specifically, when the 
purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus, a short work-day duration negatively affects 
the evaluation of output quality (Hypothesis 1), whereas when the purpose of the performance 
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evaluation is a promotion, a short work-day duration positively affects the evaluation of output 
quality (Hypothesis 2).  
 In a supplementary path analysis, I explore why work-day duration is interpreted 
differently, depending on whether the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a bonus or a 
promotion. When the purpose of the reward is to determine a bonus, I find that as work-day 
duration increases, employees are perceived to be more hardworking and the perception of 
hardworking positively influences evaluations of output quality. I also examine when the 
purpose of the reward is to determine a promotion. Similar to when the performance reward is a 
bonus, I find that as work-day duration increases, employees are perceived to be more 
hardworking and such perceptions positively influence evaluations of output quality. However, 
when the purpose of the reward is to determine a promotion reward, I find that as work-day 
duration decreases, employees are perceived to be more efficient and the perception of efficiency 
positively influences evaluations of output quality.  
 In Experiment Two, I examine a setting where the evaluated employee produces 
moderate quality work (as confirmed by a validation test). Again, I compare short work-day 
duration professional employees to equal work-day duration employees. I find that when the 
purpose of the performance reward is bonus, the evaluation of output quality for short work-day 
duration employees is lower compared to equal work-day duration employees (Hypothesis 3). 
However, when the purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, the evaluation of output 
quality for short work-day duration employees is not significantly different from equal duration 
employees (Hypothesis 4).  
Taken together, my results suggest that in bonus decisions, subjective evaluations of output 
quality for short work-day duration employees will be lower compared to equal work-day 
 74 
duration employees whether the output quality produced is good or moderate. However, in 
promotion decisions, short work-day duration employees will receive higher subjective 
evaluations of output quality only when the output quality produced is good.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
My study has limitations that provide opportunities for future research to explore. First, 
my results may be sensitive to the method used to manipulate work-day duration. In my study, I 
examine work-day duration that is observed in an office setting. However, work-day duration 
can be observed in a virtual office setting. Work-day duration in a virtual office setting may be 
observed if employees who work remotely are logged in to a virtual platform where their status 
shows as available or unavailable. Employees who are always set to available may not be 
perceived as hardworking compared to employees who are physically present in an office setting. 
For example, because Supervising Managers are physically unable to see employees, they may 
question whether the employees are actually at their desks working or out engaging in personal 
tasks. Future research could explore whether my observations generalize to virtual office 
environments. Second, the results may be sensitive to the subjective output I have created. In this 
study, I examine subjective output that is in written form. There are many other different types of 
subjective output that could be evaluated in a professional workplace setting, which may be more 
ambiguous and, therefore, more difficult to evaluate (e.g., customer relations or mentorship of 
junior employees). Some research suggests as the object of evaluation becomes more ambiguous, 
the more likely it is that outside factors can influence evaluations (e.g., Hsee 1996a). Finally, in 
my study I examine how Supervising Managers evaluate output of a single employee. In 
practice, some Supervising Managers may be responsible for evaluating output of more than one 
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employee (e.g., a tournament where evaluations depend on relative performance evaluations). 
Some research suggests that an evaluator will make different evaluations when there are multiple 
items to evaluate, compared to a single item (e.g., Hsee 1996b). Future research could explore 
whether my observations generalize to settings where Supervising Managers evaluate multiple 
employees.  
 
6.4 Conclusions  
 
 My dissertation makes contributions to accounting research and practice. Existing 
research suggests that one way to improve compensation contracting is to use subjective 
performance measures to evaluate output that is not objectively determined (Holmstrom 1979). 
However, if subjective evaluations result in inaccurate assessments of performance, it could 
undermine the intended benefits of subjectivity (Prendergast and Topel 1993). First, my study 
extends our understanding of how cognitive limitations in subjective evaluations lead to 
inaccurate assessments (e.g., Bol and Smith 2011; Bol and Leiby 2018). Different from prior 
research, my study identifies that a non-informative contextual cue (i.e., work-day duration) that 
provides no information about subjective quality does in fact influence subjective evaluations. 
Second, my research extends our understanding of the role of duration in performance 
measurement and incentives. Existing research that examines the role of duration often does so 
in settings where (effort) duration is an important determinant of output. Effort duration is 
usually contractible and is increased through the use of various type of incentives (e.g., Tafkov 
2013; Awasthi and Pratt 1990; Hecht et al. 2018). My study differs from such conceptualization 
of duration as I examine the role of work-day duration, which does not have a direct relationship 
with work output.  
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 This research provides contributions to practice. My study provides insights to 
Supervising Managers who evaluate output that is measured using an element of subjectivity. 
Family dynamics in North America continue to change (United States Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Statistics 2018; Uppal 2015) and working parents are often required to juggle work 
demands with family responsibilities (Wademan Dowling 2019), which could limit the number 
of hours they spend at work. My study provides some evidence to suggest that the hours an 
employee works could influence how their work is evaluated, even though it provides no 
information regarding quality. My research brings to the forefront this important and prevalent 










aThe good quality memo was shown in Experiment One and the moderate quality memo was shown in Experiment 
Two.  
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Figure 3 Experiment One: Path Analysis a 
 




























aThe model presented is a partially constrained model where Duration à Hardworking and Hardworking 
à Subjective Quality are constrained to be equal between two groups: Bonus (N = 72) and Promotion (N = 
84). The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to 
covary. When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between 
the two error terms is 0.77 (0.57). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1. The data 
fits the model well: χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96. *** p < 0.01, * p < 
0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. 
bTwo types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus and promotion. Participants are told 
either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it 
will help determine whether they receive a promotion. 
cTwo levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either 
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in 
contrast to other employees. 
dHardworking refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking 
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to 
“Strongly Agree.” 
eEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
fSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to 
the subjective output. 
 
0.38*** 


























































Figure 5 Experiment Two: Path Analysis a 
 




























aModel Fit statistics for the fully constrained model include: N = 165; χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA = 
0.03, CFI = > 0.99, NFI = 0.98  
The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary. 
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion) the correlation between the two 
error terms is 0.67 (0.70). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1.  
*** p < 0.01. All p-values are two-tailed. 
bTwo types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80). 
Participants are told either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee 
receives a bonus or that it will help determine whether they receive a promotion. 
cTwo levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either 
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in 
contrast to other employees. 
dHardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking 
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to 
“Strongly Agree.” 
eEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
fSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to 































Table 1 Experiments One and Experiment Two: Prolific Filters and My Follow-Up Questions 
Prolific 
filter 
Question asked to 
participants in 
Prolific 
Filters selected Follow-up question to 
confirm the effectiveness 




In what country do 









At work, do you 
have supervisory 
responsibilities? In 
other words, do you 
have the authority to 
give instructions to 
subordinates? 
Yes Using numbers only, 
approximately how many 
employees have you 
supervised in the past? If 
you have not supervised 
anyone at work in the past, 




What is the highest 
level of education 









What is the highest degree 
level of school you have 
completed? 








• Associate degree 
• Bachelor’s degree 
• Master’s degree 
• Professional degree 




 Participants who took part 
in the selected studies 
(i.e., any previous studies 
using the same 
experimental task) will not 





Table 2 Experiments One and Two: Validation of the Dependent Variable Subjective Quality a 
 




(n = 156) 
Experiment 
Two 
(n = 165) 
 



























Panel B: Correlations with the Dependent Variable Subjective Quality a 
 
Question Experiment 










1. Ideas 0.70** 0.82** 
2. Organization 0.77** 0.80** 






aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst's response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bResponses are collected on a Poor–Excellent 100-point scale.  
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01. 
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Table 3 Experiments One and Two: Participant Background  
 
 
 Experiment One Experiment Two 
Education d 
 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Secondary school diploma 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
Some college/university 
 




1 1% 1 1% 
Associate degree 
 
3 2% 2 1% 
Bachelor’s degree 
 
95 61% 98 59% 
Master’s degree 
 
39 25% 42 25% 
Professional degree 
 
7 4% 14 9% 
Doctorate degree 
 
8 5% 5 3% 
Other 
 
0 0% 0% 0% 
Total 156 100% 165 100% 
 
  











Supervised a   24.70 
(56.98) 
 
















12 2–50 15.49 
(10.11) 
14 0–50 
Work Hours c 13.54 
(12.86) 
 




Table 3 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Participant Background 
 
 Experiment One Experiment Two 
Gender  
 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Female 
 
52 33% 84 51% 
Male 
 
104 67% 78 47% 
Other 
 
0 0% 3 2% 





GMAT e  
 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Yes 
 
11 7% 13 8% 
No 
 
145 93% 152 92% 
Total 156 100% 165 100% 
 
Notes: 
aSupervised refers to the total number of employees supervised by the participant. 
bWork Experience refers to the years of full-time work experience reported by the participant. 
cWork Hours refers to the average amount of time the participant spends at work each day. 
dEducation refers to the highest level of education completed by the participant. 




Table 4 Experiments One and Two: Participant Characteristics as Covariate Analysis 
Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a 
Panel A: Experiment One Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
 






























Error 151 93.26   
 
Panel B: Experiment Two Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
 





Work Experience e 
Duration c 
Purpose d 

































Error 159 589.59   
 
Notes: 
aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bSupervised refers to the total number of employees supervised by the participant. 
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
dBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
eWork Experience refers to the years of full-time work experience reported by the participant. 
fIn this table, and all the tables that follow, one-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed p-




Table 5 Experiment One: Validation Test on Output Quality 
 
















n = 23b 
91.11 
(8.08) 
n = 27 b 
81.26 
(10.97) 
n = 23 b 
78.65 
(14.52) 
n = 26 b 
 
Notes: 
aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bObservations from 99 participants are analysed. Each participant evaluates two response memos. I examine only the 
score of the first response memo evaluated by each participant. 
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Table 6 Experiment Two: Validation Test on Output Quality  
 




Good Quality Moderate Quality 
Response Memo Score  82.02 
(13.46) 
n = 51 
72.00 
(18.73) 
n = 48 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value  
(two-tailed) 
 
Response Memo b 1 2482.43 
 
9.43 < 0.01 





aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bResponse Memo refers to the subjective output participants evaluate. It is either good or moderate quality. 
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Table 7 Experiment One: Perceptions of Response Memo (Good Quality) (n = 156) 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Perception Measures 
 
  Bonus b Promotionb Overall 
Average 
 
I enjoyed reading “the Analyst’s” 
response 





























I enjoyed reading about the topic in the 
memo 




























I thought that “the Analyst” had a good 
writing style 




























I have a strong opinion about the 
problem/issue presented by the client 































Table 7 (Continued) Experiment One: Perceptions of Response Memo (Good Quality) (n = 156) 
 






Writing Style Strong Opinion 
Enjoy Reading 1.00    
Enjoy Topic 0.70** 1.00   
Writing Style 0.72** 0.56** 1.00  
Strong Opinion 
 
0.32** 0.28** 0.23** 1.00 
Panel C: One Sample T-Tests Comparing if Perception Differs from Neutral Point of 
Zero 
 




155 21.6 < 0.01 
Enjoy Topic 
 
155 19.28 < 0.01 
Writing Style 
 
155 16.40 < 0.01 
Strong Opinion 
 
155 2.78 0.01 
 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01. 
aResponses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly 
Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees.  
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Table 8 Experiment Two: Perceptions of Response Memo (Moderate Quality) (n = 165) 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Perception Measures 
 
  Bonus b Promotion b Overall 
Average 
 
I enjoyed reading “the Analyst’s” 
response 






























I enjoyed reading about the topic in the 
memo 






























I thought that “the Analyst” had a good 
writing style 




























I have a strong opinion about the 
problem/issue presented by the client 

































Table 8 (Continued) Experiment Two: Perceptions of Response Memo (Moderate Quality) (n = 
165) 
 
Panel B: Correlations Among Perception Measures 
 
 Enjoy Reading Enjoy Topic 
 
Writing Style Strong Opinion 
Enjoy Reading 1.00    
Enjoy Topic 0.78** 1.00   
Writing Style 0.62** 0.40** 1.00  
Strong Opinion 
 
0.28** 0.28** 0.36** 1.00 









164 1.91 0.06 
Enjoy Topic 
 
164 -0.19 0.85 
Writing Style 
 
164 6.66 < 0.01 
Strong Opinion 
 
164 -2.82 0.01 
 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01. 
aResponses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly 
Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees.  
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Table 9 Experiment One: Descriptive Statistics 
 





Bonus b Promotion b Overall  Average 
 
 





n = 34 
87.12 
(8.98) 
n = 42 
86.09 
(8.62) 
n = 76 
 
 





n = 38 
82.93 
(12.89) 
n = 42 
85.29 
(11.54) 






















aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 




Table 10 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 



















Error 152 101.97   
Panel B: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H1 and H2) 
 
 Difference df MS t-statistic p-value 
(one-tailed)d 
 
Effect of Duration on 
bonus eligible 
participants (H1) 
-3.07 1 169.26 1.29 0.10 




4.19 1 368.76 1.90 0.03 
 
Notes: 
aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
dPredictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed. 
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Table 11 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Hardworking a 
 






















n = 76 
 
 






























n = 156 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 


















Error 152 1.06   
 
Notes: 
aHardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking employee” 
on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
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Table 12 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Efficient a 
 





Bonus b Promotion b Overall  
Average 




n = 34 
2.19 
(0.74) 
n = 42 
2.01 
(0.83) 
n = 76 
 
 





























n = 156 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 


















Error 152 0.80   
Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Supporting H1 and H2) 
 
 Difference df MS t-statistic p-value  
(one-tailed)d 
 
Effect of Duration on 
bonus eligible 
participants 
-0.31 1 1.74 1.48 0.07 









aEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
dPredictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed. 
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Table 13 Experiment One: Path Coefficients Estimates from Multi-Group Path Analysisa  




















d  0.35 0.16 < 0.001 0.33 0.17 < 0.001 
Work-Day 
Durationc à Efficient
e  0.11 0.17 0.25 -0.20 0.18 0.05 
Hardworkingd à Subjective Qualityf  0.38 0.79 < 0.001 0.29 0.79 < 0.001 
Efficiente à Subjective Qualityf  0.24 1.17 0.05 0.37 1.23 < 0.001 
 
Notes: 
aThe model presented is a partially constrained model where Duration à Hardworking and Hardworking 
à Subjective Quality are constrained to be equal between two groups: Bonus (N = 72) and Promotion (N = 
84). The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to 
covary. When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion) the correlation between the 
two error terms is 0.77 (0.57). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1. The data fits 
the model well: χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96.  
bTwo types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus and promotion. Participants are told 
either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it 
will help determine whether they receive a promotion. 
cTwo levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either 
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in 
contrast to other employees.  
dHardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hard-working 
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to 
“Strongly Agree.” 
eEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
fSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to 




Table 14 Experiment Two: Descriptive Statistics 
 




Bonus b Promotion b Overall  Average 
 
 





n = 41 
63.50 
(24.11) 
n = 36 
63.03 
(28.15) 
n = 77 
 
 





n = 44 
63.91 
(22.35) 
n = 44 
69.77 
(20.55) 









n = 80 
65.67 
(24.44) 
n = 165 
 
Notes: 
aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s 
response/memo. Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees.  
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Table 15 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 


















Error 161 592.94 
 
  
Panel B: Results of Planned Contrast 
Contrasts Weights (-1, -1, +3, -1)d 
 
 df t-statistic p-value 
(one-tailed)e 
 








Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Supporting H3 and H4) 
 
 Difference df MS t-statistic p-value 
(one-tailed)e 
 
Effect of Duration on 
bonus eligible 
participants (H3) 
-9.46 1 1898.70 1.80 0.04 
Effect of Duration on 
promotion eligible 
participants (H4) 
-0.41 1 3.31 0.08 0.47 
 
Notes: 
aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
d“-1” is assigned to short duration/promotion reward, short duration/bonus reward and equal duration/promotion 
reward conditions. “+3” is assigned to the equal duration/bonus reward condition. 
ePredictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed. 
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Table 16 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Hardworking a 
 























n = 77 
 





























n = 165 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
























aHardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking employee” 
on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
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Table 17 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Efficient a 
 





Bonus b Promotion b Overall  
Average 
 














n = 77 
 





























n = 165 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 























aEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
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Table 18 Experiment Two: Path Coefficients Estimates from Multi-Group Path Analysisa 
 
    
 
Bonusb Promotionb 






















à Efficiente  0.03 0.22 0.66 0.03 0.22 0.66 
Hardworkingd à Subjective Qualityf  0.41 1.14 < 0.001 0.41 1.14 < 0.001 
Efficiente à Subjective Qualityf  0.38 1.23 < 0.001 0.39 1.23 < 0.001 
 
Notes: 
aModel Fit statistics for the fully constrained model include: N = 165; χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA = 
0.03, CFI = > 0.99, NFI = 0.98.  
The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary. 
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two 
error terms is 0.67 (0.70). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1.  
bTwo types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80). 
Participants are told either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee 
receives a bonus or that it will help determine whether they receive a promotion. 
cTwo levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either 
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in 
contrast to other employees. 
dHardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hard-working 
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to 
“Strongly Agree.” 
eEfficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7-
point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” 
fSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to 
the subjective output. 
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Table 19 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a 
including all Participants (n = 200) e 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) 
 
 Bonus b Promotion b Overall Average 
 
 












n = 98 
 
 



























n = 200 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 



















Error 196 139.77   
Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H1 and H2) 
 
 Difference df MS t-statistic p-value 
(one-tailed)d 
 
Effect of Duration on 
bonus eligible 
participants (H1) 
3.72 1 344.73 1.57 0.06 











aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
dPredictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed. 
e200 participants were originally recruited; 44 participants are excluded from the main analyses for either not having 
the requisite experience (19 participants) or for not being engaged throughout the study (25 participants). 
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Table 20 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a 
including all Participants (n = 200)e 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) 
 
 Bonus b Promotion b Overall Average 
 
 














n = 102 
 
Equal Duration c 
72.04 
(20.11) 






















n = 200 
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 



















Error 196 598.20 
 
  
Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H3 and H4) 
 
 Difference df MS t-statistic p-value 
(one-tailed)d 
 
Effect of Duration on 
bonus eligible 
participants (H3) 
-6.65 1 1126.68 1.37 0.08 











aSubjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the 
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst's response/memo. 
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
d Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed 
e200 participants were originally recruited; 35 participants are excluded from the main analyses for either not having 




Table 21 Experiments One and Two: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) Rational-Experimental 
Inventory (REI) Items a  
Panel A: Need for Cognition 
 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Experiment 
One  
(n = 156) 
Experiment 
Two  
(n = 165) 
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking b 0.83 
 
0.84 
2. I try to avoid situations that require in-depth thinking 
about something b 
 
0.87 0.84 
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my abilities 
rather than something that requires little thought b 
 
0.73 0.79 
4. I prefer complex to simple problems b 0.64 
 
0.68 
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something 
gives me little satisfaction b 
0.53 0.43 
Eigenvalue 






Panel B: Faith in Intuition 
 
 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Experiment 
One 
 (n = 156) 
Experiment 
Two  
(n = 165) 
1. I trust my initial feelings about people b 0.81 
 
0.89 
2. I believe in trust and hunches b 0.83 
 
0.85 






4. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on 
my “gut feelings” b 
 
0.87 0.90 
5. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even 
if I can’t explain how I know b 
0.87 0.85 
Eigenvalue 










aThe EFA was performed using a principal axis factor analysis. 
bResponses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly 
Agree.”  
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Table 22 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the Need for Cognition 
and Faith in Intuition a 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition  
 
 Need for Cognition a Faith in Intuition a 
 Bonus b Promotion b Overall 
Average 






n = 34 
1.48 
(0.87) 
n = 42 
1.53 
(1.03) 
n = 76 
0.91 
(1.03) 
n = 34 
0.85 
(1.28) 
n = 42 
0.87 
(1.17) 





n = 38 
1.04 
(1.25) 
n = 42 
1.38 
(1.16) 
n = 80 
0.69 
(1.22) 
n = 38 
1.09 
(1.19) 
n = 42 
0.90 
(1.21) 





n = 72 
1.26 
(1.09) 
n = 84 
1.45 
(1.10) 
n = 156 
0.79 
(1.13) 
n = 72 
0.97 
(1.23) 
n = 84 
0.88 
(1.19) 
n = 156 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
Effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and Need for Cognition on Subjective Quality 
 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
(two-tailed)   
Need for Cognition a 
Duration c 
Purpose b 


















Error 151 100.17   
 
Notes: 
aNeed for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants’ thinking style and is an average of 5 questions 
answered on a Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly Agree.” They were measured 
as post-experiment questions. Questions are shown in Appendix 3. 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 
to the other employees. 
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Table 23 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the Need for 
Cognition and Faith in Intuition a  
 
Means (Standard Deviations) for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition  
 
 Need for Cognition a Faith in Intuition a 
 Bonus b Promotion b Overall 
Average 






n = 41 
1.27 
(1.18) 
n = 36 
1.31 
(1.03) 
n = 77 
0.69 
(1.29) 
n = 41 
0.77 
(1.30) 
n = 36 
0.73 
(1.29) 





n = 44 
1.49 
(1.13) 
n = 44 
1.48 
(1.10) 
n = 88 
0.73 
(1.33) 
n = 44 
1.03 
(1.17) 
n = 44 
0.88 
(1.25) 





n = 85 
1.39 
(1.14) 
n = 80 
1.40 
(1.07) 
n = 165 
0.71 
(1.30) 
n = 85 
0.92 
(1.23) 
n = 80 
0.81 
(1.27) 
n = 165 
 
Notes: 
aNeed for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants thinking style and is an average of 5 questions 
answered on a Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly Agree.” They were measured 
as post-experiment questions. Questions are shown in Appendix 3. 
bBonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that 
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help 
determine whether they receive a promotion.  
cEqual/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work 
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast 





Appendix 1 Experimental Instrument 
 
















Screen 4 [Work-Day Duration and Purpose of Performance Reward Manipulations] 
 























































Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment One] 
 



















Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment Two] 
 
















































































































Appendix 2 Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations 
 







Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations 
 







Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations 
 







Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One Two: Independent Variable Manipulations 
 







Appendix 3 Experiments One and Two: Adapted Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) Items 
 
Need for Cognition a 
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking 
2. I try to avoid situations that require in depth thinking about something 
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that 
requires little though 
4. I prefer complex to simple problems 
5. Thinking hard for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction 
 
Faith in Intuition a 
6. I trust my initial feelings about people 
7. I believe in trust and hunches 
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right 
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feelings” 
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t explain how I know 
 
Notes: 
aNeed for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants’ thinking style and is an average of 5 questions 




Appendix 4 Experiments One and Two: Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and 
Attention Check Questions 
 
1. Which of the following best describes the purpose of the evaluation of the memo: 
a. Your evaluation of the quality of the memo will help to determine the likelihood that the 
Analyst will earn an annual bonus 
b. Your evaluation of the quality of the memo will help to determine the likelihood that the 
Analyst will earn a promotion 
c. Do not recall 
 
2. On average, how many hours per day does Analyst A spend at work? 
a. 6 hours 
b. 8 hours  
c. 10 hours 
 
3. For this question you are requested to choose answer c) Do not Recall 
a. True 
b. False 
c. Do not recall 
 
Related to the memo you just read, please answer the following two questions: 
 
4. The Analyst argues that the company is relying on what strategy.a 
a. Life Cycle 
b. Word of Mouth 
c. High Product Quality 
 
5. The Analyst argues that the company can use the following strategy.a 
a. Price Policy 





aThis question was asked in Experiment Two as it related specifically to the moderate quality memo. A similar type 
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